

CURRENT HISTORY

A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs



THE MIDDLE EAST

The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East	<i>Augustus Richard Norton</i>	1
Islam and Democracy: The Turkish Experience	<i>Jenny B. White</i>	7
Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension	<i>John P. Entelis</i>	13
The Business of Political Change in Egypt	<i>Caryle Murphy</i>	18
Arafat's Dilemma	<i>Muhammad Muslih</i>	23
Rabin and Arafat: Alone, Together	<i>Mark A. Heller</i>	28
Civil War in Yemen: The Price of Unity?	<i>Chuck Schmitz</i>	33
Afghanistan's Civil War	<i>Gilles Dorronsoro</i>	37

Book Reviews	<i>On the Middle East</i>	41
The Month in Review	<i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	43



AMBASSADOR UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

JAN 19 1995

PO Box 111
Big Sandy, TX 75755

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT HISTORY

FOUNDED IN 1914

JANUARY 1995

VOL. 94, NO. 588

Editor

WILLIAM W. FINAN, JR.

Associate Editor

ALICE H. G. PHILLIPS

Assistant Editor

MELISSA J. SHERMAN

Consulting Editors

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT, MARY YATES,
ANDREW M. LOVATT, JOHN RADZISZEWSKI

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

DAVID B. H. DENOON

New York University

JOHN ERICKSON

University of Edinburgh

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia, Emeritus

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Case Western Reserve University

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University, Emeritus

WILLIAM JOSEPH

Wellesley College

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

RAJAN MENON

Lehigh University

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

Boston University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

JAN S. PRYBYLA

Pennsylvania State University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford, Emeritus

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

AARON SEGAL

University of Texas

VACLAV SMIL

University of Manitoba

RICHARD F. STAAR

Hoover Institution

ARTURO VALENZUELA

Georgetown University

President and Publisher

DANIEL MARK REDMOND

DANIEL G. REDMOND

Editor and Publisher, 1943-1955

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Publisher, 1955-1988

COMING NEXT MONTH: LATIN AMERICA

Current History turns toward Latin America in February with a series of articles addressing the US intervention in Haiti and the challenges facing President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's new government. Brazil and Argentina, wrangling with internal corruption, could see dramatic changes because of recent elections. United States-Latin American relations, Central America's militaries, and Suriname are also covered. *Articles scheduled to appear include:*

- **Corruption in Haiti**
TONY MAINGOT, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
- **Haiti's Economic Challenge**
ANTHONY BRYAN, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
- **The Haiti "Intervasion" and the US Legacy**
GADDIS SMITH, YALE UNIVERSITY
- **Brazil after the Elections**
CARLOS EDUARDO LINS DA SILVA, FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO
- **Argentina: Facing a New Direction?**
JUAN CORRADI, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
- **Suriname: Nations Against the States**
GARY BRANA-SHUTE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
- **The US and Latin America**
PETER HAKIM, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
- **Central America's Militaries**
RICHARD MILLETT, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

NO ADVERTISING

Current History (ISSN 0011-3530) is published monthly (except June, July, and August) by Current History, Inc., 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127. Copyright © 1995 by Current History, Inc. Second-class postage paid at Phila., PA, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *Current History*, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127. Annual subscription rate: \$31.00. Foreign \$37.25; Canada \$38.25 (GST included). Canadian GST #R132446592. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, *The Abridged Reader's Guide*, *Book Review Index (BRI)*, *ABC POL SCI*, *PAIS*, *SSCI*, *Current Contents*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Academic Index*, *Magazine Index*, *Magazine Article Summaries*, and *America: History and Life*. Indexed on-line by *DIALOG*, *BRS*, and *Information Access Magazine Index*. Microfilm: University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI. Requests to photocopy should be sent directly to Current History. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts.

Printed in the United States.

CURRENT HISTORY

January 1995

Vol. 94, No. 588

Islam. Democracy. Mutually exclusive terms? This issue of *Current History* tries to answer that question with an examination of how these two systems have fared when they have come into contact with each other. The conclusions are sobering but not necessarily negative. As our introductory article notes, however, "if the perils of reform [in the Middle East] invite anxiety, the dangers of clinging to the status quo are even more unsettling."

The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East

BY AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

A river of ink has already flowed in debates over the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. While there is sharp disagreement as to why, most observers take a dim view of democracy's chances in the immediate future. Governments rich with oil buy off dissent; Islamists with impressive public support deride democracy; culturally embedded patterns of patronage undermine popular participation in politics; and civil society is weak and easily manipulated. Each of these points has merit. Nonetheless, the pressures for change are formidable, and regional rulers intent on survival may find political reform irresistible. A democratic Middle East may be long in coming, but there is good reason to believe that the region stands on the brink of a momentous era of change.

One of the most obvious indicators is the dramatic picture of rapid population growth and growing citizen demands in the region. Aggregate rates of natural increase, though high in comparison to the remainder of the world, are often dwarfed by urban population growth. In Iran, cities are growing at 5 percent a year, while in Saudi Arabia the increases are nearly 8 percent annually. If sustained, many cities will double in size over the next 10 to 20 years. Middle Eastern populations are young, and growing younger. Forty percent or more of the population of most of the region's countries are under 15. Even providing primary education poses an extraordinary challenge, especially in the less wealthy states, where schools are already inadequate. Unemployment and underemployment are high, and

will only grow. At the same time, literacy has steadily increased in the region, and while female literacy rates lag considerably behind those for males, the changes over time are quite striking. Rising female literacy rates portend declining birth rates, but the effects will not be felt for decades. In the intervening years, women will enter the workforce in greater numbers, further increasing demands for job creation.

CRACKS IN THE MONOLITH

The average citizen in the Middle East may not yet be cruising the information superhighway, but gone are the days when government controlled the news. In Cairo, Damascus, Algiers, or Baghdad, international radio and television signals penetrate government censorship and bring images of the world that confound government-approved versions. Even in out-of-the-way Djibouti, an estimated 40 percent of households have satellite dishes. Access to modern communications technologies such as computer e-mail—which inherently undermines vertical structures of control—is growing. As of 1994, Internet connections existed in Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, joining the region to 2.5 million computers worldwide. Cyberspace is dawning in the Middle East.

The proliferation of printing ateliers and corner shop photocopy machines ensures that people have more to read than government-dominated newspapers. Popularly oriented political tracts and religious pamphlets are readily available from street vendors. Villagers and city dwellers traveling across borders in search of work return with fresh images that often reflect poorly on the quality of life at home. Equally important, labor

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON is a professor of international relations at Boston University, director of the Civil Society in the Middle East program at New York University, and coproducer of the film "Quest for Change: Civil Society in the Middle East."

migrants have earned the money to support protest movements and collective self-help organizations.

Though government ineptitude, unresponsiveness, and corruption are a given, complaints about government abuses of power—corruption and nepotism, torture and mistreatment of prisoners—are increasingly common. One young Egyptian man from Heliopolis, referring to Egypt's political class, expressed the contempt of many when he noted simply, "They are all crooks." Although many citizens, given government intolerance for dissent, choose to remain mute, the resultant cynicism further erodes support for government.

While encompassing only a relative handful of activists, a human rights movement has emerged. Just over the course of the past two to three years, human rights workers have begun to actively collaborate across borders, and Arab activists have even met with Israeli counterparts to find common ground for their work. Just as important, human rights has entered the vernacular of villagers and townspeople. In Turkey one now encounters municipal parks in provincial towns dedicated to human rights, and in rural Egypt villagers have organized human rights leagues.

Although articulate movements for political reform are small—with the important exception of the Islamists—the appetite for reform and change is growing. A long list of Arab governments have discerned discontent and have already attempted reforms with widely varying degrees of success—notably Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Obviously, democracy is not a necessary outcome of political reform, nor will all efforts to make the political system more efficient or more responsive succeed. Reform does, however, imply an increase in the accountability and responsiveness of those who rule and, therefore, will necessarily involve limits to power as well as the application of the rule of law. In other words, reform entails political liberalization.

PUTTING THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN CONTEXT

The most important pressures for reform emanate from the myriad Islamist movements that have emerged over the past two decades. In fact, the authoritarian state succeeded in creating a vacuum that is being filled by the Islamist movements. Whereas independent political parties, associations, and clubs have been stifled by state controls, the mosque is much more difficult to police. It is relatively simple to outlaw a party, but the Muslim state can no more shut down a mosque than a North American or European government can lock the doors of a church. The state has, however, sought to maintain control of the mosque by keeping religious officials on the government payroll, hence exerting unmistakable influence on the content of the Friday sermon. But at least since the early 1970s,

there has been an explosion of private, unlicensed mosques that have eluded state control. In key Middle Eastern countries such as Algeria and Egypt, unlicensed mosques comprise nearly half of all mosques.

It is a commonplace that the growth of Islamist movements is a reflection of Islam's inherent appeal over secular ideologies, which are often derided as alien and failed. There is some truth to this, but equally important, the Islamists have adopted a strategy of power seeking and have combined this strategy with a penetrating critique of government performance. The populist Islamist movements have tapped into a well-spring of discontent; they have not resumed the natural march of Muslim history. Of course, the failure of government to implement sharia (Islamic law) is often cited as part of the Islamists' critique, but central to that critique is the emphasis on corruption, malfeasance, and misbehavior. The mistreatment of people at the hands of government is a constant refrain. The Islamist critique is persuasive because it rings so true.

In the same place but at another time, the recruitment successes of the Islamist movements would have belonged to leftist or nationalist parties. This was the case in the 1950s and 1960s, when crowds thronged to the streets to acclaim Gamal Abdul Nasser or wave the flag of Palestine. Today the natural counterpart to the failure of the authoritarian state is Islamism. Ironically, in the not so distant past several governments aided the Islamists to undercut the strength of the political left, as in the case of Egypt under President Anwar Sadat. Israel turned a blind eye to Islamist activities in the mid-1980s, particularly in the Gaza Strip, in an attempt to undermine the strength of the more secular Palestine Liberation Organization.

Scholarship on the Islamists has been overly textual, too inclined to report the words of the ideologues and the spokesmen, and insufficiently sociological, failing to look at the motives of those who lend their support to the Islamist movements. In fact, rank-and-file supporters of the Islamist movements are remarkably mobile in terms of granting or withdrawing their allegiance. More important, allegiance to an Islamist organization often has much less to do with piety or religiosity than with the organization's demonstrated efficacy and integrity.

In Lebanon, for example, many Shiite Muslims have shifted from the reformist Amal movement to the more radical Hezbollah for prosaic reasons: Amal is corruption-ridden and inefficient, whereas Hezbollah has demonstrated a fine-tuned sensitivity to its constituency's needs and has sustained a reputation for clean dealing. In Turkey, the March 1994 electoral victories of the Islamically-oriented Welfare Party, though interpreted in some quarters as a harbinger of the growing salience of religion in Turkey, says more about the demonstrated ineffectiveness of the party's rivals than a resurgent Islamism.

Some governments have exacerbated their difficulties by trying to emulate the rhetoric of the Islamists. Indeed, religious personalities enlisted to speak on behalf of the government are often discredited by their role or end up buttressing Islamist opposition voices. Either way, the government loses credibility.

As present authoritarian governments weaken, their rulers will be increasingly tempted to resort to demagogic appeals to Islam. This sort of ideological pandering is unlikely to work, as the example of the last shah of Iran illustrates. By mid-1978, sensing the resonance of Islamic symbolism, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decreed the adoption of the traditional Persian solar calendar and took other superficial steps intended to "Islamicize" his regime. We all know how the story ended.

Steps to demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law, perhaps by curbing police (and secret police) abuses or stemming corruption, will be more successful than attempts to appropriate Islamist discourse. As it is, when the government validates the Islamist *dawa* (call), it often lends momentum to efforts to coerce and persecute non-Muslim minorities (as in the case of the Copts in Egypt, for example).

Even where governments have not purposely assisted the Islamists, they have aided them indirectly. Just as surely as birds fly and fish swim, authoritarian governments stifle dissent. Where government has impeded if not thwarted autonomous forms of association—political parties, unions, and professional groups—the ensuing vacuum in civil society has been a boon to Islamist organizers.

The indisputable popularity of the Islamist movements challenges governments to respond. But Islamists come in many flavors. Several governments, notably in Tunisia and Egypt, have met the challenge with an iron fist, thereby validating radical ideologues who want to bring down the system rather than reform it. Although it has received surprisingly little notice, the Islamists have been seriously rethinking their views and objectives concerning state, society, and political reform. Western scholars, often striking a tone that might be confused with apologia, have argued for the complementarity of Islamic concepts like consultation and consensus with democratic procedures. These analyses have missed the point; the crucial thinking among Islamists these days deals with questions of tolerance or civility, minority rights, and confidence or security.

OUTSIDE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

Internal pressures for reform interact with external ones, lending even greater momentum to demands for change. Notably, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict will add to domestic pressures for better government in the Arab world. In the confrontation states (Jordan and Syria primarily), demands to reallocate money from the

defense budgets will likely grow. With few exceptions (Tunisia arguably), the officer corps represents a crucial base of regime support, and officers have benefited handsomely from fat defense budgets and the associated privileges and perks. There is no doubt that any attempt to cut real spending on the military will be met by firm uniformed resistance. In fact, the initiation of reform projects that shortchange military spending could provoke military intervention to forestall the process. Even efforts to pull defense budgets into the limelight could cause a protective military reaction. In Egypt, as elsewhere in the region, the military budget is protected from public scrutiny or even nominal legislative oversight.

Thinking of the Middle East as a single region has always presented an analytic challenge. Now that superpower rivalries no longer mask the Arab-Israeli conflict, subregional conflicts will become more obvious, as well as more divisive. New sources of regional turmoil may emanate from attempts by hegemons to interdict reform in a neighboring state. The role Saudi Arabia played in the 1994 Yemeni civil war is instructive; informed reports underscore the deep involvement of the Saudis in fomenting the fighting.

The end of the cold war also deprives many Middle East states of the automatic support of a superpower sponsor. In Syria, for example, there is little doubt that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's upbraiding of Hafez Assad during the Syrian president's 1988 visit to the Kremlin was a decisive turning point. No longer able to bank on Soviet largesse, Assad was brought cheek to jowl with the imperative of coming to terms with Israel and, hence, the United States.

Nonetheless, United States aid continues to flow into Egypt and Israel, and to a lesser extent Jordan. The United States Treasury may issue these checks for years to come but, as the Arab-Israeli conflict winds down, the Republican-dominated Congress may choose to stop fattening the sacred foreign aid cows of Egypt and Israel, which devour over \$5 billion annually.

No doubt there will be financial sweeteners in any regional peace package, but these sweeteners are more likely to be one-time payments rather than aid programs. In the case of Egypt, it is plain that United States aid allows the government to hold off on reform. It is precisely in those states that have contemplated financial disaster where experiments in democratization have occurred. Thus Algeria and Jordan were on the brink of insolvency when their respective reform programs were launched. In short, the prospect of financial collapse mightily concentrates the mind on reform as a means of dissipating public disaffection and anger, and sharing the blame for the pain of economic restructuring.

Societal pressures for change should not be minimized in those states that do not stand on the brink of fiscal disaster. Although consultative councils that

exist in all the Arab states of the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf (except Kuwait and Yemen, which have parliaments), they are a far cry from autonomous legislatures. There should be no mistaking the fact, however, that these bodies have been created to satisfy the quest for change.

The richer Arab states, in effect, offer cash rebates to the West—especially the United States. For years the wealthy oil-producing states of the Gulf have been indirectly paying for their security through the purchases of a myriad of weapons systems and armaments that have helped make the Middle East the single most important arms market in the world. An innovation came during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Arab Gulf states chipped in to underwrite the deployment of allied forces to the Gulf. Saudi Arabia alone paid \$55 billion in support of Operation Desert Storm.

Last October, when United States forces, with French and British support, deployed to Kuwait as a counterpoise to Iraqi forces that had moved near the Kuwaiti border, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia magnanimously agreed to pick up the tab to the tune of about \$1 billion. These reverse payments, however self-interested, raise additional problems for the relevant regimes. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the regime has been steadily criticized for its profligate spending on guns, its inability to counter Iraqi aggression despite a bulging arsenal, and its dependence on the United States for defense. With an on-call rent-an-army, why spend all those billions on tanks, planes, and installations in the first place?

Prices on the international oil market are flat, and in major oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia fiscal belt-tightening has become the norm. Given the demographic pressures they face, the impressive array of entitlements they provide to their citizens are not sustainable. The absence of taxation systems, many scholars have argued, give the citizens in these states no incentive to demand a voice in government. But a reduction in entitlements may have the same impact as an increase in taxes. If so, and since oil prices do not promise to increase dramatically, these regimes will also not be immune to demands for change.

PSEUDO-ELECTIONS

Most Middle Eastern governments have opted for the symbols of democracy, not the substance. Even so, that autocrats choose to go through the motions is instructive; while they may deride the suitability of democracy for the Middle East, they concede the universality of democratic symbols. Observers are not fooled by displays of pseudoparticipation any more than the people of the region are. When Syrian

President Assad won a 1991 plebiscite with 99.8 percent of the vote, or Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali won in 1994 with only 99.3 percent, or when disdained candidates were declared winners in Moroccan parliamentary elections in 1993, few voters confused what was happening with democracy. Indeed, many Middle Eastern elections are so blatantly manipulated that most people simply conclude that it is better not to vote. In Egypt's 1990 parliamentary elections fewer than 10 percent of eligible voters actually cast ballots in many Cairo districts. And given the chance, voters have shown ingenuity in thwarting rigged elections. In the Moroccan elections, the number two vote winner often was the null ballot; voters paid to vote for the pro-government candidate simply put nothing into the ballot box.¹

Metaphors such as "the Arab street" treat the average man and woman as though rational choice were alien to the Middle East. Unlike citizens in Europe and the United States, it is often assumed that Middle Easterners are easily roused by the shrill rhetoric of demagoguery rather than the calculus of self-interest. Yet there is ample evidence to show that, given the choice, working class people are perfectly capable of casting protest votes, *lending* loyalty to those who provide services more competently than the government, discerning between local and national interests, shifting allegiance, or concluding that an election is meaningless.

Given freely contested elections, the incumbents would win few votes. Governments have grossly overestimated their popularity, with unsettling results. In Algeria the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) designed an election, replete with gerrymandered districts, that was calculated to produce an overwhelming victory. Instead, in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, the FLN won 15 seats while the opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won 188 out of the 430 total seats. The FLN design worked quite well but not for the intended beneficiary. With 48 percent of the total national vote in the first round of balloting, the FIS was positioned to win a large majority in parliament in the second round. For many of the Algerian voters, the FIS was not the Islamist party; it was a credible opposing voice to a discredited ruling party.

The Algerian example illustrates the importance of carefully designed electoral mechanisms—not to deny the venting of opposition voices but to avoid overstating the popularity of the government or its opponents. Thus, any serious discussion of political reform must pay attention to different techniques of organizing balloting. In Algeria a proportional system would have assured the FIS the major voice in parliament, but would have precluded a situation in which it could have easily mustered the two-thirds vote necessary to amend the Algerian constitution. Moreover, if a propor-

¹Henry Munson, an election monitor, generously shared this information.

tional system had been in use, voters might well have thrown their support to smaller opposition parties. In the winner-take-all system that was used, a vote for a small party, no matter how articulate its leadership or compelling its program, was a wasted vote.

The January 1992 coup in Algeria marked not only the end of the country's dramatic experiment in political reform, but also the end of a period of experimental reform in the Maghreb (Arab North Africa) and the rest of the Middle East. Following the FIS electoral victories, many Arab elites lost their enthusiasm for reform, and certainly for democratization. In Tunisia and in Egypt, Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak suddenly found a middle class constituency urging caution rather than demanding a more open system.

Skeptics, more taken with the frailty of civil society than with its potential, have learned the wrong lesson from recent experiments in democratization. There is no question that civil society lacks the power to confront existing regimes in the Middle East; but the oppositional power of civil society has generally been exaggerated throughout the world.

Nonetheless, when the state opens up public space, the blossoming of civil society, even if inchoate, is impressive, as was seen in Algeria and Yemen. Given the opportunity to mature, these organizations not only lend vitality to experiments in open government but serve as counterweights to populist movements such as the Islamists. Civil society will not mature overnight, however, which is why the project of reform must be seen as a gradualist endeavor.

As for the FIS, the radicalizing effect of the coup was both predictable and tragic. But the violent behavior of the FIS—when denied the fruits of its earned electoral victory—cannot be extrapolated backward to predict how it might have behaved had it been allowed to assume legislative power. Algeria's descent into civil war has certainly illustrated that the logic of violence is an unlikely cure for the problems dogging Middle Eastern states. The Algerian army is a professional, well-trained body, yet it has been unable to impose its will on the country. And recent government actions indicate that a dialogue between the FIS and the government may well be in the offing.

For the Islamists, the decision to participate in elections is almost always contentious. Time and again, the decision to play splits the Islamist movement, though not into equal parts. Hardliners portray the decision as a sellout, saying state-dominated elections as meaningless and worse, a case of playing into the hands of the rulers. Moderates, consistently bringing a

majority with them, argue for a gradualist approach, and seize on the legitimacy that comes from competing. Not surprisingly, the decision to exclude the Islamists from elections usually, though not always, solidifies and radicalizes the Islamist opposition, submerging hardliner-moderate distinctions. There are exceptions, as in Tunisia, where the proscribed al-Nahda has, under the leadership of Rashid Ghannouchi, been remarkably restrained despite the Ben Ali government's exclusionist position.

Perhaps the most surprising example of Islamist participation in elections comes from Lebanon. In the mid-1980s the Lebanese Shiite party Hezbollah was intent on revolution and castigated the idea of compromise. Hezbollah ridiculed its adversaries for cooperating with the Western-dominated Beirut government and spent its energies expanding its social base among the Shia, who comprise about 35 percent of Lebanon's population. At the same time it sustained a vigorous resistance campaign against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

As though mimicking a dull student, those who oppose the inclusion of Islamists in elections keep insisting that we do not know how the Islamists will behave. We now have several important examples of Islamist participation in open elections. The examples in Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon clearly show a willingness to play by the rules, at least while in the minority. More important, the process of inclusion promotes pragmatism and moderation; service in government and inclusionary politics tend to reduce radicalism.²

Of course, we do not yet have an example of Islamists successfully gaining power through the electoral process. Allusions to the Sudan, where an Islamist government came to power through a coup, or Iran, where a revolution toppled the shah, are not instructive. The dynamics of the violent seizure of power and incremental political reform have little in common. Reform implies accommodation and compromise, while revolution is synonymous with the subjugation, or even eradication, of adversaries.

Those who oppose the electoral participation of Islamists point to the Islamists' positions on women, minorities, Israel, and the West. These are not trivial concerns, but to begin with the proposition that Islamicists' values preclude any form of participation in the political process is self-defeating and a recipe for confrontation. Values bend in the face of necessity. That is an empirical fact. Guarantees are essential to address the justified fears of minorities and others who see Islamism as a fundamental threat. This also means that human rights and other watchdog organizations must be given space to develop and the fetters on civil society removed. The legacy of authoritarianism cannot be reversed overnight, but unless governments take gradual steps to open up public space and permit civil society to develop, then only the rulers and the

²For an important study that demonstrates the moderating effect of inclusion, see Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Islamists will be left—in stark confrontation. At that point, examples from Khartoum to Teheran become strikingly relevant.

THE IMPASSE

The key question is whether Middle Eastern governments really wish to reform. The evidence is not altogether encouraging. Last March, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood issued a memorandum accepting multiparty competition and the values of a pluralist society. The document is a significant deviation from the teachings of the late Hasan al-Banna, the founder and “supreme guide” of the Brotherhood. The memorandum was virtually ignored by the government. The “national dialogue” Mubarak convened in June was, as one prominent Egyptian put it, more like a company meeting than a serious attempt to talk about political reform.

In Egypt, as in many other Middle Eastern countries, government response to opposition or potential opposition ranges from cooptation, subversion, and imitation to manipulation, domination, and emasculation. When nongovernmental organizations are gaining support, it is not uncommon for the government to create its own lookalike NGO or alter the rules governing them. Thus in Yemen the government established its own human rights organization to counter the Human Rights League. In Jordan the regime has sponsored a women's organization to undermine more independent female NGOs. In Egypt the government has changed the electoral rules in professional syndicates (niqabat) to thwart Islamist electoral victories. In Sudan the ruling junta moved aggressively to put

Islamists in leadership positions in the independent-minded syndicates.³

The Islamist opposition is often too strong to be eradicated, yet too weak to topple the state through direct action. In some countries such as Egypt, an impasse has been reached. This offers two possibilities: sinking deeper into the mire of obduracy or bridging the impasse through dialogue and compromise. President Mubarak has chosen the former course, arguing that distinctions between moderate and extremist Islamists are unjustified. In other settings, the second course has been taken, with instructive results.

From the smaller states of the region—including Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon—we find a handful of examples of dialogue. These dialogues have culminated in pacts that formalize agreements and, through their visibility, provide some protection for moderates on both sides.⁴ (Significantly, the Algerian reform experiment was not the product of dialogue but decree, which helps explain the failure of the experiment.) Governments may require nudging and pushing in the direction of dialogue by major powers. And outside powers will have to guarantee internal processes of reform and be prepared to stifle meddling by recalcitrant authoritarian governments like Saudi Arabia.

The pressures for political reform are being felt across the Middle East—which is not to argue that ruling autocrats are contemplating retirement cottages in Provence. Those who rule do not savor conceding power. Nonetheless, sharing power through inclusionary reform is a means of preserving some power. Even in Libya the resident eccentric, Muammar Qaddafi, has been moving along the path of reform. Strategies of inclusion will obviously vary, and reverses are to be expected. The path of reform is strewn with risks for the present leaders and for the opposition, as well as for outside players. Nonetheless, if the perils of reform invite anxiety, the dangers of clinging to the authoritarian status quo are even more unsettling. ■

³These examples are drawn from studies by Sheila Carapico, Laurie Brand, and Moustapha Kamal al-Sayyid, in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, two vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994 and 1995).

⁴Pacts are discussed in Ghassan Salamé, ed., *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1994).

"Islamic groups in Turkey are so diverse that it does not make sense to speak of a single Islamic movement or even a fundamentalist resurgence. Nevertheless, Islam is an important element in Turkish social and political life. There is, without doubt, a fundamentalist element, albeit a complex one, whose interests stand against those of the secularists. The political and ideological space between these positions, however, is occupied by a large number of intermediate groups."

Islam and Democracy: The Turkish Experience

BY JENNY B. WHITE

Can Islamist movements be integrated into political systems in the Middle East? Turkey, the region's only fully secular democracy, is often pointed to as an example of what is possible. Indeed, in local elections last March, the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party (RP) won 19 percent of the national vote, putting Islamist mayors into office in 29 large cities, including Istanbul, Turkey's most cosmopolitan city, and Ankara, the capital and birthplace of the republic's secularist doctrine. To some, the RP's success demonstrates the possibility of including religious ideologies in a multiparty democracy. To others—especially among Turkey's westernized and determinedly secular elite—it is an alarm bell. They fear in the RP's success the beginning of a long slide into restrictive fundamentalist codes of conduct and, eventually, a state based on Islamic law (sharia). Such hopes and fears are typical throughout the Middle East as Islamic groups participate in—and win—elections. Can one extrapolate from the Turkish experience? Or are there unique historical and cultural factors that make the Turkish encounter with Islam and democracy unique?

SECULARISM FROM ABOVE

Unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey has a centuries-old tradition as a state autonomous from the religious sphere. Turkish sovereigns laid no claims to religious leadership until the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman sultan, to consolidate his power, claimed the caliphate, or leadership of the world's Muslims. Nevertheless, a clear line remained between the secular power of the sultan and the religious authority of the *ulema*, or Islamic scholars. This dissociation of the temporal from the spiritual provided fertile ground for secular reforms in the nineteenth century and for the

emergence in the twentieth of a modern state founded on popular sovereignty.

The founding of the Turkish republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was accompanied by bold and all-encompassing moves from above to westernize and secularize the new nation. The caliphate, religious courts, and other religious institutions were abolished and religious affairs were put under state control. The Latin alphabet and Gregorian calendar were introduced in place of the Arabic alphabet and lunar calendars. The fez was outlawed in favor of Western-style hats, and wearing the veil was discouraged (and banned outright in the civil service). Islam was to be a private affair. Then, as now, the state's attitude toward Kemalism and secularism was highly rigid: insulting Atatürk is still a crime.

Except for the secularized elite, however, Islam has never been absent from the social and cultural lives of most Turks. There is thus a long tradition of couching opposition to the state in Islamic terms. Before the introduction of multiparty politics in 1945, Islam was the only channel for protest, since the state monopolized all legitimate political expression and left no room for the development of an independent civil society. One of the earliest Kurdish revolts (in 1925) was launched and sustained using Islamic rhetoric, under the leadership of the Nakshibendi religious brotherhood (*tarikât*). The state responded by banning all Sufi (mystical religious) orders and closing their lodges. Yet Sufi orders, which had been enormously powerful political and social forces under the Ottoman regime, have continued to play an important role.

Gradually the policy of "personal Islam" was replaced with a more militant secularism. In textbooks throughout the land, nationalism was to be taught as the new principle to bind together the ethnically diverse remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a republic of citizens. Folklore, language, literature, and music were pressed into service; separatist voices, such as those of the Kurds, were suppressed.

JENNY B. WHITE is assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and author of *Money Makes Us Relatives: Women's Labor in Urban Turkey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994).

The result was that the mass of Turkish people were alienated by the state's militant secularism. The governing Republican People's Party (CHP) was seen by many as representing a new westernized ruling class and its alien culture of modern dress and Western music. The lack of material prosperity also fueled discontent; religion provided an avenue for expressing popular frustration.

ISLAM'S POLITICAL VOICE—KURDS AND THE ECONOMY

That avenue for expression broadened when Turkey's first major opposition party, the Democrat Party (DP), came to power in multiparty elections in 1950. Since then, Islam has emerged as a regular political player (except during six years of military intervention). The Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party (MSP), the precursor of the RP, participated in three coalition governments between 1973 and 1980. Since 1991, however, Turkey has been ruled by a coalition of the center-right True Path Party (DYP) and the leftist Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). It has been during their reign that two pivotal issues—the economy and the Kurdish rebellion in the southeast—have come to a head, adding new force and new complexities to Islam's political voice.

In the 1980s Turkey opened its economy to international competition. The present government has embarked on a drive to privatize many of the state's massive industries. Economic growth, however, has been offset by consistently high annual inflation rates of between 60 percent and 100 percent and by a steadily rising national debt. The costs of the new policies have reached many, the benefits few. As in other countries, the introduction of an open market economy has been accompanied by growing socioeconomic inequality. The contrast is especially apparent in the cities, which the rich share with masses of migrants from the countryside.

Turkey's large urban centers, especially Istanbul and Ankara, are plagued by a lack of services—polluted tap water, regular water shortages, or no water at all—and suffer from air pollution so severe that in the winter of 1993 some Istanbul residents wore surgical masks when venturing outside; traffic is congested and public transport unreliable and overcrowded.

Unemployment is high and living standards are plummeting. The minimum wage hovers around \$80 a month. Early in 1994, as part of the government's austerity program, the Turkish lira was devalued, effectively halving the buying power of salaries. Salary increases for civil servants were frozen for the year. The government later relented and granted the country's 1.7 million civil servants an increase of \$7 for the third quarter and another \$13 for the last quarter, an amount, one government worker remarked dryly, that just about buys one large watermelon. A negligible 15

percent increase in government salaries has been promised for the first of the new year.

Many shopkeepers do not replace their stock; they simply double or triple the prices and wait anxiously for customers. Yet on the wealthy side of Istanbul, shopowners report that sales are good. Well-dressed people stroll the broad boulevards, carrying bags of expensive purchases. The stark economic inequality gives impetus to Islamic groups that preach social justice and an end to favoritism and corruption.

Many Turks blame deteriorating economic conditions on government expenditures to fight Kurdish separatists. (Ankara's "iron fist" will devour over \$9 billion in 1994.) For more than 10 years, the government has been waging a virtual civil war against the outlawed Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), a socialist guerrilla group. The war gained new momentum in the summer of 1993 when Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, seeking a closer relationship with the military, gave it what amounted to *carte blanche* to crush the movement. A systematic and brutal campaign of intimidation of representatives of the Kurdish-based Democracy Party (DEP) followed. This campaign was carried out by state security forces, aided, some believe, by fundamentalist Islamic groups that espouse a "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis." Just before the March 1994 local elections, DEP mayoral candidates were threatened and a bomb exploded at DEP headquarters in Ankara. The DEP did not participate in the elections.

Hundreds of Kurdish villages have been systematically burned and razed in order to uproot support for the PKK. In October the minister for human rights, Azimet Koyluoglu, himself a Kurd, issued an unprecedented public protest, accusing the army of state terrorism. Intimidation and the displacement of large numbers of Kurds to areas where they were not officially registered and therefore unable to vote had the desired effect of eliminating the pro-Kurdish vote in the March elections.

To thoroughly purge pro-Kurdish sentiment, in June the Constitutional Court outlawed the DEP, charging it with politically supporting the PKK. The parliamentary immunity of DEP representatives was lifted to allow their arrest; six fled to Europe, and eight others are on trial, accused of endangering the integrity of the republic, a crime that carries the death penalty. The press has been intimidated, and international concern seems to have had little practical effect, since the violence continues unabated. At the end of September, two Kurdish politicians belonging to the People's Democratic Party (HADEP), the legal successor to the banned DEP, were killed. These murders, like those of other Kurdish elites, will likely remain unsolved.

A political solution has become increasingly untenable. The rise in Kurdish nationalism, in part a consequence of the government's scorched earth policy and the continuing poverty of the southeast, comes at a

time of multiple challenges to Turkey's national health. The unequal effects of economic restructuring and rampant urbanization have revitalized the Islamic movements as well.

ISLAM IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL ISLAM

The Islamic movement in Turkey, however, is far from united. At the political level, Islam is appealed to by several parties, either out of conviction or political expedience. At the popular level, the *tarikât* is still an important institution. Religious brotherhoods, which were banned in the 1920s, still are not allowed to practice openly, although in reality the government turns a blind eye. After 1945 they began to reappear in political life, once politicians realized that religious sheiks could deliver blocs of votes.

Brotherhoods vary from the politically active fundamentalist Nakshibendi and Suleymanci to such philosophically left-of-center sufi brotherhoods as the Bektashi and Mevlevi, better known as the Whirling Dervishes. The latter two are active primarily at the cultural and associational level, although they may ally themselves with particular political positions. The Bektashi serve as a kind of Masonic secret society in business. The socially and politically liberal Alevi, a non-Sunni religious minority estimated to make up around 20 percent of the Turkish population, were recently granted the right to reopen their lodges and practice openly.

Some fundamentalist groups, such as the Tijani and Nurju, are organized like sufi brotherhoods but appeared in Turkey only in this century. Their open participation in political life is sporadic; the Tijani are notorious for periodic attacks on statues of Atatürk, which they condemn as idols.

A more mysterious group, the Hizbullah, which is suspected of having ties with Iran and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, is waging an armed campaign to establish an Islamic state in Turkey. It has been suggested, however, that the name is a gloss for a number of small but violent fundamentalist groups, such as the sharia fascists that set fire in July 1993 to a hotel hosting a conference of liberal journalists, writers, and intellectuals. The arsonists had been encouraged by a sermon against the famous Turkish writer Aziz Nesin, who had translated portions of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* into Turkish. Nesin, who was at the hotel, escaped; 37 others were killed in the fire. Local officials, including the Welfare Party mayor, were accused of holding back police assistance and firefighting equipment, even when the severity of the situation was clear and orders had been given by superiors to intervene. Several secular journalists, educators, and other elites have been assassinated in recent years. Most prominent among them was Ugur Mumcu, an outspoken proponent of secularism and the author of

several books exposing and documenting financial connections between Saudi Arabia and Islamic groups in Turkey and Germany.

Turkey also boasts a strong contingent of elite Islamists, a diverse group of educated men and women who espouse a range of interpretations of Islam, from modernist to traditionalist. Since the mid-1970s these Islamists have entered the state bureaucracy and the economy, and are now bidding for intellectual recognition. Islamic feminists want to use Islam to liberate themselves from patriarchal constraints. They support a woman's central role in the Muslim family, but want to become educated, work, and be politically active. To further their cause, they publish a magazine, *Kadın ve Aile* (Woman and Family), with suggestions for the improvement of women's lives within an Islamic framework.

Islamic groups in Turkey are so diverse that it does not make sense to speak of a single Islamic movement or even a fundamentalist resurgence. Nevertheless, Islam is an important element in Turkish social and political life. There is, without doubt, a fundamentalist element, albeit a complex one, whose interests stand against those of the secularists. The political and ideological space between these positions, however, is occupied by a large number of intermediate groups.

CHANGE IN TWO DIRECTIONS

After the RP's electoral success, the fundamentalist/secularist opposition became highly charged. Small portraits of Atatürk appeared in such unusual places as people's living room windows. For many years de rigueur, displaying Atatürk's portrait now means taking a stand. Indeed, what many on both sides perceive to be a battle is most visible in a parade of easily read symbols: flags, colors, music, types of clothing and head coverings, or shapes of beards.

Walking through Fatih, one of Istanbul's most conservative neighborhoods, one encounters turbaned male students and teachers from Islamic schools openly flouting laws that ban the wearing of religious headdress. Equally striking is the occasional female resident in jeans or a sleeveless dress, which was unthinkable several years ago. Some young women in working-class neighborhoods have traded in the headscarf for jeans and shorts; others have put it on. Indeed Turkey seems to be spreading symbolically in two directions at once—toward a culturally and economically Western way of life, and toward a more devoutly Islamic mode.

The situation in the countryside is complicated by regional and ethnic factors, as well as by the influence of large numbers of labor migrants and their children who have returned from Germany, many of whom have determinedly westernized tastes and the money to indulge them. Others carry back the radical Islam that

Percentage of National Vote in Municipal Elections, 1989 and 1994

	1989	1994
True Path Party (DYP)	25.6	21.4
Motherland Party (ANAP)	21.9	20.1
Welfare Party (RP)	9.6	19.1
Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP)	28.7	13.6
Nationalist Action Party (MCP/MHP)	4.4	7.9

has sprung up in the diaspora, unregulated by the laws and policies that undergird secularism in Turkey.

While some see in this a danger to Turkish society or polity, a broader view shows it to be a familiar picture: the sometimes uncomfortable riot of positions characteristic of democracy. This complexity becomes particularly cogent when one takes a closer look at the recent election results, which seem to many to reflect a rise in fundamentalist loyalties in Turkey.

AN ISLAMIC THREAT?

Although religious and nationalist parties doubled their votes in the March 1994 local elections, it is also clear that the parties of the center-right held their position. Left-of-center parties, on the other hand, declined precipitously.

Compared to the previous local elections in 1989, the Islamic-based RP more than doubled its percentage of votes nationally and garnered 28 of 76 mayoral seats in provincial capitals, including 6 of Turkey's 15 largest cities. Five years ago the RP had no more than 5 mayoral seats. The numbers for district centers (similar to county seats) were more astounding, going from 15 to 80 mayoral seats.

The highest percentages of RP votes were in the east and Kurdish southeast. These results can be interpreted as a protest vote against the main parties, but can also be seen as the result of efforts by the state security forces to build up Islamic brotherhoods such as the Nakshibendi as an alternative to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The Nakshibendi, who are included in the RP, historically have played an important role in maintaining Kurdish cohesion and identity.

Yet if one leaves out the unusual situation in the southeast, the RP emerges as the representative of its traditional constituency: the nationalist, central Anatolian merchant class, and a new constituency, urban migrants.

Because of a mistake in voting protocol (some say fraud), elections were held again on July 10 in three Istanbul boroughs. The RP carried only one borough and, much to its chagrin, lost its stronghold, Fatih. Secularist groups, which had canvassed the neighborhoods in an attempt to get people to change their votes,

proclaimed victory. But even here things may not be as they seem. One explanation given for the RP's loss in Fatih was that the Fatih leader of the Nakshibendi was so offended by the conspicuous consumption exhibited at RP leader Necmeddin Erbakan's daughter's luxurious Sheraton wedding that he vowed the RP would not win in his borough. The ANAP winner, Sadettin Tantan, like Erbakan, is a Nakshibendi. As one not very impartial journalist put it, voting for Tantan over Erbakan was like escaping from hell by climbing into the devil's taxi.

Less spectacular but just as important is the fact that the two center-right parties captured 42.4 percent of the vote. They won almost as many provincial capitals as the RP, and surpassed the RP by far in the district centers. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's DYP emerged as the strongest party, with 21.4 percent of the national vote. The other center-right party, The Motherland Party, (ANAP), also did well, with 20.1 percent of the national vote and a tremendous gain in district centers. The RP's 19.1 percent thus must be weighed against the strength of a combined centrist vote.

The big loser was the left. The SHP lost a lion's share of its constituency. In calling for economic justice, the RP has taken over the social democrats' traditional role of representing those who sit below the salt in the economy. This helps explain the remarkable shift of some former leftist intellectuals to an Islamist position, a phenomenon that has occurred in other Middle Eastern states.

The RP has strengthened its claim that it is the champion of economic justice by offering free or subsidized services, ranging from communal circumcision ceremonies to sewing and Koran classes, to those suffering from the government's draconian economic policies. During the campaign, the party also used economic, rather than primarily ideological arguments. This may be due to caution about Turkish laws banning political parties from advocating an Islamic state, but it also reflects citizens' real concerns.

Unnoticed in the brouhaha over RP successes was the doubling of votes by the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to nearly 8 percent of the national vote. The party doubled the number of provincial capitals it holds to 6 and added 42 district center mayoral posts.

For many observers, the municipal elections were a test of the strength of the ruling parties and an indication of how they might fare in next year's parliamentary elections. On their own, the major parties are demonstrably weak. Neither was able to garner more than a quarter of the vote, barely exceeding the RP. Seen in this context, the RP success provoked fear and expectation. The combined votes for the two extreme right parties exceed the support mustered by any single centrist party.

Number of Provincial and District Centers Won, 1989 and 1994

	1989		1994	
	Province	District	Province	District
True Path Party (DYP)	16	193	13	212
Motherland Party (ANAP)	2	152	13	278
Welfare Party (RP)	5	15	28	80
Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP)	40	264	11	12
Nationalist Action Party (MCP/MHP)	3	10	6	52

Note: Figures for 1989 and 1994 are not strictly comparable because new provinces and districts were added.

The question remains whether, by the 1996 parliamentary elections, the RP can retain and consolidate votes that in this election were cast in protest of or dissatisfaction with established parties and their politics. Given the complex factors underlying voter loyalties, this remains an open question. The coalition parties have been shaken by scandals, such as wealthy Prime Minister Ciller's extensive investments in the United States, accusations of tax evasion, and ANAP's internal power struggles and shake-up of ministers. Corruption also is rampant at the municipal level, where politicians are accused of hiring relatives and misusing funds. The RP has promised to clean up the streets, improve public services, and eliminate corruption and nepotism.

If RP mayors can show results and not go to extremes, they may do well in 1996. After the municipal elections, however, several attacks were reported on women in Western dress in downtown Istanbul, and attempts were made to separate women from men on public transport. RP mayors had statues of nudes removed from parks. They closed down or razed restaurants, nightclubs and beerhalls, along with illegally built homes in squatter areas. On the anniversary of the founding of the republic, RP mayors found reasons not to attend the festivities, which are heavy on Kemalist and secularist symbolism, or made disparaging remarks. These actions did not draw support from the Turkish public, but rather criticism, ridicule, and protest.

The religious vote has been successful in part because it is felt to be sanctioned by the government, which has tolerated Islamic manifestations even where these are in the realm of illegality. The government also sanctions Kemalist secularism, but this does not find much resonance among the people. Nevertheless, nationalism to some degree offsets Islam. As one elderly and devout shopkeeper explained, "Sure, I voted for [the RP] because they'll do a better job at the local level. But I would never vote for them for the state because they want to change Turkey into something

that isn't Turkish. After all, we're not Iran or Saudi Arabia." Turkey is not Iran, but many Turks are disgusted by Western modernism in advertisements, in the media, and in the ostentatious display of the new urban rich. As in many other parts of the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds, they seek a return to traditional values.

There are some fresh faces on the political scene. Of particular interest is Cem Boyner's New Democracy Movement (YDH). The YDH seeks a dialogue with Islamic parties, and a stable government that will leave the country room to develop its free market. Boyner was head of the Turkish Businessmen's Association and represents a part of the business community and some secular elites. The public, however, is still suspicious. Boyner does not seem to connect well with nonelites, and people are unaware of his platform. A young tradesman summed up his opinion of Boyner with a shrug, adding, "He's good-looking." Over against the other parties, the RP looks clean and competent, but the political pack is still without a leader.

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The RP may owe its electoral victories to protest and pragmatism, but its organizational methods have been crucial in its success. Unlike other parties, the RP does not rely primarily on the media to get its message across, but works face to face. Street by street and village by village, cells of voters are built up. Activists are matched to voters in their district by age, gender, and place of birth. On election day voters are given rides to the polls. The RP also maintains many types of clubs that bring together potential voters. The RP's strategy relies on building interpersonal trust. It takes full advantage of neighborhood, regional, and other cultural bonds that tie people to one another in mutual assistance as well as its flip side: mutual obligation.

The RP's success has roused the secularist camp: middle-class women, in particular, feel threatened by the lifestyle changes assumed to be the intent of the RP

and have begun to join women's and secularist organizations in greater numbers. The newly created Women's Platform joins the leaders of more than 20 secularist women's organizations.

But there are also flares of secularist or simply pragmatic non-Islamic civil society in working-class neighborhoods. Some are organized from outside, by middle-class or university women. Many, however, are truly grassroots. They often appear in response to a particular practical problem, such as lack of water or a need for job training. These groups operate on the same principles as the RP: interpersonal trust based on community affiliation. This refers not only to traditional relations based on family or tribe, but more generally to a rule fundamental to those ties—mutual assistance and obligation—which forms the basis of new ties with nonkin neighbors and regional compatriots in the new urban environment. This is something intrinsic to Turkish society, not unique to Islamic groups.

People situate themselves as citizens over and against the municipal representative of state authority and largesse, and organize themselves along the fundamental requirements of a fictional kinship. "We are children of the state; the state is *Baba Devlet*, Father State." Privatization and the free fall of a relatively unregulated market economy have led to a feeling of abandonment by the state and "fending for yourself." The RP has recognized the fictional kinship that underlies working-class political life and is busily making itself the benevolent patriarch.

DEMOCRATIC FROM THE GROUND UP

In Turkey people believe that democracy—voting—is the only legitimate way to attain political power. This is in part due to the fact that political parties have plugged into the traditional networks of regional, religious, and family affiliations to gain support. These networks, which operate through communal pressure and patron clientism, may also constrain and restrict the rights of some, such as peasants and women, to exercise their votes freely. However, the massive social changes that have reshaped Turkey also may ultimately undermine the political relevancy of traditional patron-client ties. In towns and cities there

are new networks that coexist with relations built on families, Islam, patron-clientism, and native-place networks. They do not replace them, but interpenetrate. And these new networks make a political space available for women.

This is the contradiction of Turkish political life: state repression combined with thriving diversity. What filters out to the West is the bad news, fed by the fear of the educated, secularized elites. There is little outside attention to the syntax of working-class life, which is mutual assistance and obligation. With the present economic circumstances, the groups and parties that speak this language best are the ones that will be heard. At the moment it is the RP, rather than the fratricidal mainstream parties, that has the ear of the masses.

The Turkish political system is inclusive, not only at the obvious level of political parties of many stripes, but at the level of local community action. Despite the seeming blanket effect Islamic groups have on Turkish social and political life, secular groups are alive and well and organizing. Given the contradictions and unpredictable currents that run below the surface of Turkish political life, all that can safely be predicted is that there will be change. The direction depends on who can best speak to the mass of working-class voters about their immense economic problems. There is a sizable conservative element, neither Islamist nor secularist, and there is pragmatism even among the devout.

The system is also brutally exclusive of expressions of Kurdish identity and forms of dissent. The actions taken by the present government show confusion, panic, and a lack of clear leadership; their end result is counterproductive, since it builds support for opposition forces.

To return to the original question: Is Turkey a model for democratic inclusion of Islamic movements? The answer is that the success of Islam in Turkish politics, while reflecting ideological divisions in Turkish society, is equally an expression of unhappiness with the performance of the parties in power. "A better standard of living," as Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres pointed out at the 1994 Middle East economic summit in Casablanca, "remains the best weapon against fundamentalism." ■

"An embittered and embattled society faces a frightening future. While Western governments might like to see 'liberal secularists' with broad-based support come to the fore, no such possibility exists in the near future in Algeria."

Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension

BY JOHN P. ENTELIS

Despite the publicity militant Islam has received, the principal Muslim opposition movements in Algeria and the remainder of the Maghreb subscribe to a nonviolent transfer of power. The three most popular and influential movements—Abdesalam Yassine's Justice and Charity in Morocco, Rachid Ghannouchi's an-Nahdah (Renaissance) in Tunisia, and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria headed by Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj—are in fact politically moderate, though all are banned.

Neither government oppression (in Tunisia), civil war (in Algeria), nor monarchical intimidation (in Morocco) has extinguished support for these groups, especially among people living on the margins but also among elites. Yet the situation is strained by extremist groups emerging within movements as well as those created outside them. For their part, government hardliners have instituted their own solutions, ranging from intensified political repression in Tunisia to expanded surveillance of suspected groups by Morocco's Interior Ministry to the application in Algeria of brutal force in the form of state-sponsored death squads. Human rights abuses and civil rights violations have risen dramatically in recent years, as reports from Amnesty International and Middle East Watch last year confirm. In Algeria alone, between 15,000 and 30,000 people have died in the violence that has raged since the January 1992 military coup.

Should incumbent governments succeed in eliminating nonviolent Islamic groups, they will face a serious vacuum that can only result in greater political instability and social uncertainty. In short, while popular support for nonviolent Islamists in North Africa is

holding, it is challenged daily—from above by recalcitrant officials and from below by fringe groups prone to violence. Should nonviolent Islamists be forced under or radicalized into violence, stability and democracy in the Maghreb will be unlikely anytime soon.

RETURNING TO THE FAITH

Nonviolent Islamic reformism and revivalism in Arab North Africa have a long history, dating back to the early days of colonial occupation and even before. *Salafiyya* (from *salaf*, forefather) movements emerged in all three countries of the Maghreb in response to external intervention and perceived threats to indigenous culture and belief. Inspired by the *salafiyya* movement, North African Islamic reformers emphasized the importance of returning to the Koran and *hadith* (prophetic traditions) as the basic sources of faith and practice. The reformers were particularly concerned with social and economic issues, but they conceived of these in religious and moral terms. Their movements intended not only to define a new doctrine but also to create a social movement through which the new ideas could be passed on to the young. And behind the reforms was a political imperative: achieve independence and reestablish the region's Arab-Islamic identity.

Today's nonviolent Islamic-based political movements are thus following in a recognized tradition. They use the power of the mosques and the streets to challenge the authority of regimes viewed as illegitimate. Such movements seek through prayer and preaching to mobilize popular support for a political program that promotes their ideas for the just and good society as defined for them by Islamic teaching. They further influence people through debates at youth centers, pamphlets distributed in poor neighborhoods, and work in the community. They sponsor mass rallies, large demonstrations, and public assemblies that are testament to their impressive organizational abilities. While such efforts may at times degenerate into violence, violent action is not a structural component

JOHN P. ENTELIS is a professor of political science and director of the Middle East studies program at Fordham University. His most recent publications on Algeria are John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor, editors, *State and Society in Algeria* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), and "Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria," in John Ruedy, editor, *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994).

of either the movements' strategic thinking or their tactics. And if reformist movements have in both the distant and the recent past given rise to radical offshoots—especially when moderation has failed to achieve results quickly or broadly—the nonviolent reformers do not bear the responsibility.

Islamically based political opposition movements in North Africa can be broken down into three separate but at times overlapping categories. One is made up of the individuals and groups that reject the authority of official or state-sponsored Islam and instead promote nonpolitical action in education, culture, and social activities. They believe in "bottom-up" political change resulting from a strategy of acculturation, socialization, and education. At the core of their thinking is a reemphasis on religious training and education of the young so as to ensure a devoutly Muslim political future.

A second group, equally committed to the goal of a more "authentic" Muslim society, calls instead for direct political action to attain it. Its members advocate the use of democratic and electoral means—political organization, mobilization, and participation—to bring about a nonviolent transfer of power in the nation. Reform of both state and society is at the heart of their political agenda.

In the third category are militant hardliners who want to quickly transfer power by any means, political or military, including violence, terrorism, and assassination. Its members subscribe to a puritanical belief system, and most favor the imposition of Islamic law, strictly interpreted. It is to this group that the label "Islamic fundamentalism" best applies.

MODERATE WINDS IN ALGERIA

Interviews with government officials, independent Algerian scholars, French journalists and researchers, and FIS (Front Islamique du Salut, or Islamic Salvation Front) leaders and supporters confirm that the front remains the premier movement of political opposition in Algeria today. Should elections be held in the near future, the FIS would win, as it was about to when the government halted the December 1991 legislative elections. The group's "mainstream" political leadership—Abassi Madani, Abdelkader Hachani, Rabah Kébir, Anwar Haddam—continues to remain committed to a political solution to the country's current crisis, the occasional militant rhetoric of Kébir and Haddam notwithstanding. These so-called *jazairis*—those committed to a distinctly "Algerian" solution to Algerian problems—reject all models of a pan-Islamic society, advocate an electoral strategy for assuming power, and support the gradual application of sharia (Islamic law) in Algeria. However, the more radical positions of FIS leaders Ali Benhadj, Kamareddine Kherbane, and other so-called internationalists committed to an Islamic holy war—and inspired by Iran and

other "foreign" models—are still considered part of the spectrum incorporated within the Islamist "front."

Islamic revivalism emerged in Algeria as part of the awakening of Arab-Muslim consciousness in the Middle East and North Africa during the period between the world wars. After gaining independence from France in 1962, the Algerian state officially incorporated Islam. The new ruling military-party hierarchy integrated Islam's religious institutions, co-opted its clerical class by requiring state-approved certification, and screened (and sometimes even composed) Friday mosque sermons. All this was administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, through which the state supervised and controlled the expression of Islamist thought. Respected religious thinkers who were identified with *salafiyya* reformism were allowed to voice their ideas within a narrow religious court framework. To ensure ideological compliance, these thinkers were often named to posts as government functionaries responsible to the Religious Affairs Ministry.

Yet official Islam in independent Algeria was challenged from the very beginning. The bloody riots of October 1988, in which thousands of young people took to the streets to protest against the state's chronic failure to satisfy socioeconomic needs—basic education, adequate health care, employment opportunities, available housing—transformed Islamism in Algeria into a political movement. A new breed of politically active Islamists—bent on reforming state and society not just by social action and education but through direct involvement in the political process—came to the forefront. Islamists did not spearhead the October riots, but acted as a stabilizing force, with people like Ali Benhadj, at the time an activist preacher at the Sunna mosque in the capital's Douba district, helping to restrain the rioters' anger.

It is Benhadj's fellow FIS leader, Abassi Madani, who probably best exemplifies the philosophical as well as generational link between the preachers (religious Islamists) and politicians (reformist Islamists) of oppositional Islam. Born in 1931, Madani joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) on its creation in 1954 and, after his arrest for participating in the outbreak of the insurrection that November, spent the duration of the war of independence in prison. He emerged as a leader of the Islamist movement after the November 1982 demonstrations at the University of Algiers, at which time he co-signed (with Islamic legal scholars Sheik Abd al-Latif Soltani and Sheik Ahmad Sahnoun) a list of 14 demands aimed at the regime. That act earned him more than a year in prison.

With the move toward more political openness that followed the 1988 riots, the Islamic Salvation Front was formed in March 1989 and legally accredited as a party in September 1989. From its outset the front was an amalgam of different currents of political thought within the Islamist movement, and although its mem-

bers agree on the ultimate goal of an Islamic state based on sharia, there are disagreements over both strategy and tactics. Moderate and radical wings look to Madani and Benhadj, respectively.

Despite their different personalities and tactics, Madani and Benhadj have come to symbolize the basically cooperative character of political Islam. They did not allow their differences to impede the FIS in organizing and mobilizing support. After the party's legalization the leadership quickly began to prepare for local and regional elections set for June 1990. While the ruling FLN enjoyed a considerable edge in funding and organization, the FIS surprised many with its rapid formation of a party infrastructure. This was attributed to its use of a preexisting network of mosques throughout the country, its ability to organize cadres already involved in Islamist activities, and the considerable skill and charisma of Madani and Benhadj. The results were overwhelming FIS victories in the June elections and then in legislative elections in 1991—despite the incarceration of both leaders that June.

Emboldened by the front's success, Sheik Mahfoud Nahnah and Abdellah Djaballah created their own Islamist movements, Hamas (Movement for an Islamic Society) and an-Nahdah (Renaissance), respectively. Both represent a form of moderate Islamism less willing to challenge the state. In fact, it is uncertain whether the two are truly independent of government control, and some have suggested that they are being manipulated by the state in an effort to "divide and rule" political Islam. It also seems likely that the authorities are attempting to revive the legitimacy of the preachers and clerics of "religious" Islam in order to undermine the popularity of the FIS.

Following the arrest of Madani and Benhadj and the suspension of the 1991 election results following the January 11, 1992, military coup, the FIS leadership split. Some advocated a hard line toward the government while others promoted dialogue. All, however, were ultimately displaced following the army's banning of the FIS in March 1992 and the arrest of many of the front's leaders and followers, including pro-Madani moderates like Abdelkader Hachani. Unsurprisingly, the violent strand of Islamism has reemerged to spearhead the struggle against the government.

PHASE 2: TURNING TO RADICALISM

Despite its belief in the primacy of politics over revolution, the FIS is increasingly radicalized by the circumstances in which it finds itself: the front's two leading figures are under house arrest, thousands of FIS militants are holed up in desert camps, government-directed death squads are killing or intimidating front supporters, and the regime is entirely under the control of a military determined to impose "law and order" at any cost. In response, the front has pursued a dual strategy, political and diplomatic on the one hand and

military on the other. While unable to confirm the precise organizational links between the FIS and the plethora of radical groups that has emerged since the January 11, 1992, military coup, it is clear that whatever ties exist serve to apply pressure on the ruling military group. Madani's and Benhadj's release from prison and placement under house arrest last September 13 may signal a shift in the regime's policy, though it is still too early to evaluate this largely symbolic gesture.

Yet a fundamental historical and structural distinction separates more moderate reformers from radicals. While the former use violence as a tactic of last resort to pressure a recalcitrant, oppressive leadership, the latter consider violence central to the political "cleansing" necessary to establish a new social order.

Islamic radicalism in Algeria is associated with Mustafa Bouyali—a man who conducted a violent struggle against what he described as the "impious" state from 1981 until 1987, when he was killed by government security forces. His followers never laid down their arms, however, and continued to fight viciously against the hated secular nation-state.

Pacified during the FIS's domination of the political landscape between 1989 and 1992, radical Islam has resurfaced with a vengeance since the 1992 coup. The current crop of radicals is composed of former Bouyali followers opposed to the FIS's political strategy and a new breed of salafiyist militant—the latter "re-Islamized" by the FIS and further radicalized following the interruption of the electoral process in 1991.

The Bouyalists were pardoned by President Benjedid in November 1989, and the last group of them still in jail reentered society when the FIS was already legalized and operating. Encouraged by the FIS-organized strikes of May and June 1991 and, more decidedly, by the 1992 coup, they now form the core of those militants involved in the most violent acts against the state. Their goal is straightforward and unambiguous: total destruction of the "corrupt" nation-state, which they want to replace with a pure, "authentic" Muslim state.

The newer generation of Islamic radicals has been intellectually inspired by FIS figures who have turned away from the movement following the suspension of the elections. The best known among these is Said Mekhloufi, a 40-year-old former army officer who in early 1991 published a pamphlet on "Civil Disobedience: Foundations, Objectives, Means, and Methods of Action" that was distributed in mosques throughout the country until the government banned it.

In the pamphlet, Mekhloufi writes that "democracy is a method used by the state to bend people to its wishes." And: "the point of view of the majority cannot be taken into account when preparing for an Islamic state." Public contests of political power have no future as the sole tactic of a resistance; those who desire change must instead pursue "a unique solution consist-

ing of completely overturning the regime based on popular struggle using the principle of civil disobedience"—which itself is an intermediary step between political action and armed military action. As a consequence of his writings and beliefs, Mekhloufi was removed from the consultative council of the FIS in July 1991 when it decided the front would participate in December legislative elections. He went underground, and continues to direct actions against the state in the *maquis* (hinterlands).

Another Muslim radical instrumental in creating an "Islamic armed struggle" is Abdelkader Chebouti, an officer in the guerrilla FLN who served in the army after independence and was among the Bouyali followers granted amnesty in 1989. Never a member of the FIS or its supreme council, Chebouti had close ties to Ali Benhadj, who had flirted with the Bouyalists. Mekhloufi and Chebouti came to represent a fusion of the ideological puritanism of the salafiyists with the armed militancy of hardened guerrillas—whose formative experience included combat time in Algeria's war of national liberation, the war in Afghanistan, and the fight in the *maquis* with Mustafa Bouyali. It was therefore no surprise when Mekhloufi and Chebouti teamed up in 1992 to create the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), whose name, intent, and spirit borrowed directly from the Bouyalist experience. In early 1992 the ruling military junta overturned the December 1991 election results, forced the resignation of President Benjedid, installed a puppet regime of discredited ex-National Liberation Front politicians, and abolished the FIS as a legal political party. As a result the MIA became the FIS's unofficial armed wing and so brought the Islamic radicals to political prominence in Algeria.

If Abassi Madani represents the FIS's political and philosophical link between the preachers and the reformers, Ali Benhadj represents that between the reformers and the radicals. Born in 1956, Benhadj, a former high school teacher, has been an Islamic militant since the 1970s, with close ties to the Bouyali group. He is emblematic of the many radicals in the Middle East and North Africa who are Arabic-speaking teachers in primary and secondary schools and who act as independent imams, preaching their redemptive messages in mystical tones. Also in this group are petty arabophone functionaries who resent their subordinate status to their French-educated superiors; men marginalized by their society who have experienced a romantic conversion to the "sacred" Islamic cause; and army deserters bitter because their Western-trained and -educated officers passed them over for promotion.

The radicalization of elements of the reformist group is a direct result of the regime's refusal to allow the FIS the fruits of its presumptive 1991 electoral victory. Nonetheless, these ex-FIS militants (who have formally separated themselves from the political wing of the

movement as well as those who have joined/created another organization) still articulate an eminently political Islam that could find resonance in a more reformist and Islamic political environment.

But in the current climate of violence and terror, an even more militant and radicalized form of reform has emerged to challenge all three brands of Islamism: the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Established in 1989, this diverse set of Islamic radicals challenges the political leadership of the FIS and the military command of the MIA. Its leaders are considered by members "scourges of God," dedicated to "purifying" Algeria by fire and steel. No one is immune from their attacks—nationalists, foreigners, journalists, writers, entertainers, even moderate Islamists like Madani.

It is unclear how deeply anchored the GIA is among youth and others who might become supporters, if not activists, in the "armed struggle." What is less in doubt, however, is the impact of army enforcement measures on the otherwise indifferent and inert youth living in the slums of large Algerian cities. As the level of violence has escalated, government forces have conducted police sweeps (recalling the hated French practice in the war of independence) and tortured subjects—which have led the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods to look on the state as their enemy. In the squalor of places such as Eucalyptus, a rundown suburban city eight kilometers south of downtown Algiers, the arrest of teenagers whose only interests are sports and American movies and music reverberates throughout the city's other neighborhoods. In the backlash young people are becoming politicized, and the principal beneficiaries have been the MIA but also the FIS.

Rage against the authorities is widespread, and a broad range of political groups have lost legitimacy, including the FLN. For the poor and the hopeless, the FIS represents the armed struggle to provide justice to those who demanded it in the October 1988 riots (in which poorer Algerians played a central role), and whose rage the suspension of the elections three years later only stoked. The mobilization of youth behind the FIS is not a knee-jerk reaction to Islamism, but instead reflects a respect for the concrete accomplishments of the FIS in areas of daily concern for the inhabitants of poorer neighborhoods: crime, jobs, housing, sanitation, health, and law and order.

NONVIOLENT ISLAMISM NOW OR NEVER

While the armed struggle is waged among a triad of increasingly violent forces—the army, the MIA, and the GIA—the political wing of Islamism in Algeria, the FIS, attempts to remain the premier political opposition movement. Its efforts to maintain a convincingly nonviolent posture, however, are ever more difficult—especially as events on the ground override restraints urged by any one individual, group, or movement.

Moderate FIS leaders have been forced underground or abroad: Abdarraziq Rajjam is in hiding, Rabah Kébir in Germany, and Anwar Haddam in the United States. Activities in Algeria have been taken up by small groups of armed men operating under various and changing political labels, yet dedicated to the violent overthrow of the state by any means possible. While these groups are not supported by the majority of the front's adherents, they have impressed many of the disenfranchised youths holed up in the country's urban slums. These same young people are further radicalized by the government's hardline policy on violence. Thus while Kébir and Haddam give interviews in the West about the need for a peaceful transfer of power, Chebouti and his guerrillas, with the experience they acquired as mujahideen in Afghanistan, are conducting war in the countryside and the cities.

Since late 1993, both the armed struggle and the political struggle in Algeria have intensified. The fighting and killing in the cities and the countryside continue while the political offensive has been maintained, with the need for nonviolent opposition increasingly stressed in the press releases, news interviews, and public declarations of the Islamic Salvation Front's two leading spokesmen abroad, Kébir and Haddam. Kébir in particular has been especially active in presenting the front's "human face," although his earlier political actions were anything but nonviolent.

The release of three second-tier FIS officials from prison and Madani's and Benhadj's house arrest have increased the pressure on moderates on both sides of the divide as they face hardliners in their own camps while trying to maintain the integrity of their positions in the larger struggle for control of the Algerian state and society. The military government's "opening" is an opportunity to start up a national dialogue but also a gamble, as the immediate reaction of recalcitrants such as former Prime Minister Redha Malek (the release is a "unilateral surrender" placing the republic "under mortal danger") has clearly demonstrated. So too with Islamist leaders like Madani, who since his release from prison has firmly rejected the regime's invitation to participate in the national dialogue it was setting up to reconcile political differences. A letter Madani sent to the government was intended to provide evidence that the FIS had not compromised its principles. No national dialogue could take place, the FIS leader wrote, until the following six conditions were met: the installation of a "neutral" government until a "legitimate" government was elected; the re-legalization of the FIS; the lifting of the state of emergency; proclamation of a general amnesty; the cessation of all judicial and police proceedings against Islamists; and the army's return to its barracks. For their part, GIA spokesmen have rejected the government's gesture in no uncertain terms, reaffirming the group's "complete

opposition to any reconciliation, any truce, any dialogue with renegade governments." Such threats are being taken seriously by Algerian authorities as well as by foreign governments. Last November's roundup of 95 suspected Islamist "terrorists" in France—many holding French citizenship—demonstrated the extent of radical penetration abroad.

The debate in the Islamist camp over a "societal" approach to Islamization, achieved through education, social activities, and cultural programs, and a "statist" approach, which sees direct participation in the political process as the way to capture power and then remake society (advocated by the majority in the FIS), seems to have been bypassed by the ongoing armed struggle between Islamic radicals and government hardliners. Daily killings and assassinations by government death squads and Islamic terrorists alike have paralyzed the Algerian state and society.

The nonviolent strand of Algerian Islamism is at a tragic crossroads. Few individuals can directly influence the course of events. However, an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of nonviolent Islamists' grievances—who represent a major part of the population living in large and medium-size cities—could provide hope that an alternative to violence has a direct political payoff. At this point, an embittered and embattled society faces a frightening future. While Western governments might like to see "liberal secularists" with broad-based support come to the fore, no such possibility exists in the near future in Algeria. Moderate Islamists represent the best hope for a transition to a nonviolent, democratic order ensconced in an Islamic social-cultural framework.

It is clear that the ruling military regime in Algiers is suffering a serious loss of legitimacy at a time when both its political and economic capital are already dangerously depleted. Few expect much political or financial help from outside anytime soon, notwithstanding the IMF program for nearly \$1 billion in new credit facilities announced last May. For its part, the FIS is pursuing a two-track strategy of political pressure and armed coercion in the hope that its military dimension will quickly be put aside once the democratic process—which it still feels sure will benefit it—is restarted. Whether the GIA and other extremist elements will undermine this effort is to be seen. But the ills that first led Algerians to give overwhelming support to the Islamists remain: political authoritarianism, a centralized economy, bureaucratic mismanagement, rampant corruption, and cultural insensitivity (such as a policy of "mindless" Westernization). Until these are rectified, any short-term military successes the extremists achieve may be rapidly overtaken by another round of extremism, in which the nonviolent Islamists could be the victim. ■

"After decades of being marginalized from Egypt's formal power structure, the business community is not asking for a direct political role. . . But it is not difficult to foresee that if the Egyptian business community received all that it wants from the government. . . it would have a revolutionary effect on the political system."

The Business of Political Change in Egypt

BY CARYLE MURPHY

They were self-assured, intelligent, and wealthy. And when they gathered in the stately, wood-paneled library of New York City's Metropolitan Club one chilly night last November, these businessmen had something else in common. They wanted to know if they had a role to play in the future of a country they once called home: Egypt.

Members of the Egyptian-American Businessmen Association, they had come together for a discussion entitled, "Experience in Investing in Egypt." They heard some tales of woe and some fables of success. Formed only three years ago, the association is an indication of the changing global environment that is creating new links, new interests, and new relationships between businessmen and governments.

This changed environment gave impetus to another initiative by businessmen in Egypt early last year. Spurred on by the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, which is comprised mainly of Egyptian managers of American firms, sent out its own missions to explore ways of expanding intraregional trade. The first two delegations visited Turkey and Syria. The idea, said Chamber official Shafiq Gabr, is to seize the initiative and begin altering how business gets done in the Middle East. "Decisions [on trade and investment] were always made between political leaders and not between businessmen," Gabr said. "We decided that we are no longer going to look at commissions headed by prime ministers. We will have our own groups."

These events illustrate a major challenge currently before the government of President Hosni Mubarak. More benign and more subtle than the challenge posed by radical Islamic militants waging a violent campaign to topple Mubarak's secular regime, it is also one that could bring tremendous long-term benefits to this

important, but increasingly impoverished Arab country. That challenge is to create a new kind of relationship between an increasingly assertive business community—both at home and abroad—and a political system that has been—and to a large extent still is—resentful, suspicious, and fearful of businessmen, and as a result, often unaccommodating and even disruptive to the private sector.

After decades of being marginalized from Egypt's formal power structure, the business community is not asking for a direct political role. Indeed, the recent activities of Islamic militants have convinced many businessmen that the Egyptian military should continue its behind-the-scenes role as the ultimate guarantor of the country's political stability. But it is not difficult to foresee that if the Egyptian business community received all that it wants from the government—privatization of public sector companies; an end to red tape, unnecessary regulations, and an obstructionist bureaucracy; the replacement of secret concessions with a transparent and competitive bidding processes; and an enlarged "space" for free enterprise to work openly—it would have a revolutionary effect on the political system.

Such reforms would inevitably create a more vibrant, energetic, wealthy, and independent private sector—in short, a new power center beyond the direct control of government that could eventually balance, even confront, those who now hold the monopoly on political power: Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party and its allies in the military, the media, and the civil service.

So far the government's response to the challenge of creating a new relationship with the private sector has been slow, contradictory, and ambivalent, and it has proceeded cautiously with changes that would give the latter greater freedom to operate. Underlying this response is the regime's ultimate fear of losing the total control it now enjoys in the political arena.

"The government is also confused," said political analyst Tahseen Bashir, a former spokesman for the late President Anwar Sadat. "They don't understand

CARYLE MURPHY, a Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent for the Washington Post, covered Middle Eastern affairs from 1989 to 1994. Currently on leave from The Post, she is the 1994-1995 Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

how a one-party system, with [opposition] parties that are all ideological" can find a method to operate "in which business has an effective say in policy making. They haven't worked this out yet." The result, said Bashir, is a government that permits the private sector a greater say in policy making only "sparingly, and with great reluctance."

THE NEW ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES

Several factors favor a realignment of the relationship between Egypt's faltering political system and the private sector. The global emphasis on trade since the demise of the communist bloc, and new opportunities for economic development and integration in the Middle East as a result of the slow but steady process of Arab-Israeli reconciliation require the elimination of outmoded economic patterns and the mobilization of Egypt's full economic resources if it is to succeed in this new environment.

The government has announced that it wants to increase its \$2 billion in export sales (excluding oil) to \$10 billion over the next five years. But this will require gargantuan steps to expand and upgrade Egypt's production base, including eliminating high tariffs and bureaucratic red tape, and improving the quality of Egypt's sometimes shoddy goods to compete on the international market.

More important, the domestic threat of militant Islam is pushing the government to realize that it needs the private sector's knowledge, technology, and capital to address the social and economic problems—including unemployment, inflation, poor schooling, and lack of housing—that have created the popular resentment on which radical Islam feeds.

With 500,000 new job-seekers coming into the market each year, and a per capita annual income of only \$650, Egypt's economy needs to grow at 6 to 8 percent a year just to keep its head above water. But in 1993 the economy only grew between 1.5 and 2 percent, and the situation worsened in the first half of 1994, when growth slowed to between 0 and 1 percent. For the past three years the rate of private and public investment has dropped, partly because of Islamic militant violence and partly because of the government's failure to generate a welcoming environment for investors.

Finally, with the United States likely to begin reducing Egypt's annual aid package of \$2.1 billion because of growing domestic demand to cut back on all foreign aid, the government will have an added incentive to harness the productive capabilities of its private sector.

Egypt's current political-economic system is the outgrowth of Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952 socialist revolution. Creating a Soviet-style centralized economy and a huge public sector through nationalization, Nasser emasculated Egypt's private sector and set back

its development by decades. Its rebirth began under Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, whose policy of "openness" or "*infitah*" allowed individual well-connected entrepreneurs to undertake economic ventures, usually in tandem with partners in government. Most of their activities involved the import and export of goods, often with government protections that allowed them to operate as monopolies. Later, with the establishment of satellite industrial towns such as "10th of Ramadan" and "6th of October," private industrialists were given a freer hand.

Mubarak continued this gradual opening of the economy by loosening controls over financial services such as banking. For example, the government has allowed foreign banks, previously restricted to dollar accounts, to begin dealing in Egyptian pounds. The Egyptian stock market has been revived, and last spring the first private bond issue since 1951 was approved and the first mutual funds were created. As a result "there is a new breed [of businessmen] coming in," said Mahmoud Wahba, the board chairman of the Egyptian-American Businessmen Association. "They are more connected with the rest of the world because they deal in financial services."

Still, Egypt's gradual retreat from socialism has mainly profited large enterprises and the politically plugged-in upper classes, whose success is evident in the growing number of chic stores and luxury cars in Cairo. Egypt imported 1,000 Mercedes in 1993 and 500 in the first five months of 1994, making it, according to a Mercedes spokesman, thirty-first among countries worldwide that buy Mercedes and second among Arab states.

By contrast, the majority of Egyptians have seen their standard of living deteriorate as a result of other economic reforms the government has made under pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The elimination of subsidies on basic foods, gasoline, and electricity has resulted in rising prices even as unemployment has grown.

Another downside under Mubarak is the perception among well-to-do businessmen and ordinary people that official corruption has increased. They complain with growing frustration and candor about alleged activities by relatives of senior government officials—including the sons of the president—who insinuate themselves into business deals merely to collect huge commissions. The result has been to convince the business community in Egypt that it does not face a level playing field these days.

A SYSTEM PILED HIGH WITH THE PAST

But what next? Mubarak is showing great reluctance to take the next step in Egypt's economic restructuring: privatizing the more than 300 companies that comprise the bloated public sector. Although this process began in 1992, only three companies—two soft drink

bottlers and a boilermaker firm—had been sold by mid-1994. Holding on to these firms is draining Egypt's resources because many receive generous state subsidies to stay afloat.

Shedding the public sector would be the strongest signal by the government that it intends to reforge its relationship with the business community and is truly turning private sector-friendly. But the slow pace with which the government has approached this task—and some backtracking—has sent the opposite signal. For example, privately owned ZAS airlines, one of the few competitors to state-owned Egypt Air, found that after 13 years of operation it was subject to new restrictions and official harassments last year at a time when Egypt Air's tourist trade losses had caused it financial difficulties.¹ The government's ambivalence about taking the plunge into a more private enterprise-oriented system is also seen in its lack of progress in reforming an obsolete and sometimes obstructionist bureaucracy and in clearing away the regulatory morass that can drown a businessman in paper and money-losing delays.

"You know how when you come into the office every morning and you clear off your desk what you no longer need?" asked a United States-trained Egyptian stockbroker. "Well, that process of cleaning up your desk doesn't happen here. There is no active management of taking away things no longer needed." He recalled returning to Egypt with a typewriter and being told by a customs official that he had to take the machine's "fingerprint," a relic of Egypt's once-obsessive concern with security. The official, his desk filled with much more modern computer-linked laser printers, proceeded at his task, oblivious to the irony.

The government's snail-like pace in privatizing the public sector is perhaps best explained by examining some likely consequences of such a move. Officials often point to the possibility of massive unemployment and social unrest if economic restructuring is done too quickly, especially if privatization leads to major layoffs. But many observers believe that a far greater concern of Mubarak's is the fear of losing political control. "I think they are afraid of having an alternative elite," said Allan Richards, a professor of economics at the University of California at Santa Cruz, who has studied Egypt's economy. "There are three bases of power in Egypt: the Islamists, the army, and the new one of business," said an Egyptian-American businessman who asked not to be named. "The issue is, will business ever be strong enough to shake up the government? I think it will happen because you can't restructure the economy the way you are doing it today without creating a new base of power."

The emergence of a more vigorous and powerful private sector whose members do not feel beholden to Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party would be a major transformation in Egypt's sociopolitical development, opening a Pandora's box of possibilities.

A second factor working against the demise of the public sector goes to the heart of how Mubarak relies on the present economic structures to maintain power. His one-man rule depends heavily on a patronage system that includes the public sector companies. These provide not only jobs for thousands of laborers, but also senior managerial posts that are filled by Mubarak appointees. In return, this constituency helps keep the National Democratic Party operating as a public consensus-builder for Mubarak's rule.

Even if this type of patronage has become less important to Mubarak in recent years, public sector managers are an entrenched constituency still marked by pro-socialist sympathies and certainly not looking forward to being out of a job. These managers are another source of obstruction to the government's professed desire to get rid of its public sector. "The people that are in charge—some of them are the same ones who came up with the idea of making the Egyptian economy state-oriented," said Egyptian businessman Ibrahim Kamel. "So, you tell me, how can you ask these people to move very fast to a transformation of the economy?"

Such socialist tendencies linger in the cabinet as well, which is packed with ministers who have been too long in power, some since Sadat's time. They are not always open to private sector proposals that would rob them of control over parts of their fiefdoms, even if they are dying fiefdoms.

A senior travel company executive, for example, related how he and others, hoping to help Egypt's tourism industry, drew up a proposal to privatize the state-run Tourism Authority, described by the executive as "a disaster." Their proposal called for retraining the authority's 625 employees, doubling their salaries, and reassigning the top 40 people to other government-run tourist enterprises, such as hotels. Only after these steps were taken would the employees be expected to perform according to private sector standards. But Tourism Minister Mamdouh Beltagui dismissed the proposal. "He won't even discuss it," said the exasperated executive. "He's a Nasserist."

Another potential pitfall if the private sector were unleashed is the impact on the Egyptian military, on which Mubarak, a former air force officer, depends as his ultimate guarantor of staying in power. The military has traditionally held a privileged position in Egypt's economy, not least through a vast network of industrial complexes, ranging from tank factories to farms, all of which enjoy special protections. Top officers can also look forward to cozy arrangements with individual businessmen and civilian bureaucrats when they retire;

¹Hedges, Chris, "An Airline Fears Cairo Will Kill It With Rules," *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1994.

many such retirees have become senior managers in public sector companies. What would be the impact of a more open, competitive economic system and a more assertive civilian business community on such arrangements? And how would the loss of such privileges affect the military's morale and its loyalty to the Egyptian president and the existing political system?

Fully embracing a more open economic system would likely have other consequences that could threaten the government's hold on power. It is already obvious that the social compact Nasser established with his people, under which they gave the government their votes and their silence in return for cradle-to-grave economic security, is now bankrupt. Unable to carry out its side of the bargain, the state needs the help of the business community and the private sector to provide the schools, medical care, housing, and jobs required for an expanding population of nearly 60 million. But once people begin receiving such services outside government structures, they no longer have the same loyalty to the incumbent political leaders and their system of rule.

Egyptian economist Heba Handussa argues that the future thrust of economic reform must be aimed at the "microenterprises" of Egypt's "informal sector" and nongovernmental groups that have "grassroots participation." The government must replace its failed system "with a new social contract that has a lot more private enterprise. It's high time for the government to pull it all together," Handussa said, adding that this will also require civil service reform and decentralization of decision making. "Egypt has to provide its own blueprint for how to do it," she noted, calling the task "urgent" because the old social contract "has been removed." It is clear that what Handussa envisions—if implemented—would amount to a major transfer of power from the state to the people.

Finally, permitting the development of a freer and more independent private sector raises the issue of the political sympathies of those Egyptian businessmen who, unlike their westernized cohorts, are Islamically minded. There is no way to accurately gauge the extent of this tendency in the business sector, but it is significant. The dominant Islamic political movement in Egypt today is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded more than 60 years ago. Its ranks are full of businessmen, both major entrepreneurs and small tradesmen, who offer it economic support. "Many businessmen support the Islamic movement, and they are the authentic Egyptian businessmen, more so than the Western-oriented ones," said an Egyptian-born businessman living in the United States. How these pro-Islamic businessmen would use the wealth, influence, and independence they could gain in a more open economic system is undoubtedly on the minds of those now governing Egypt.

"SOMETHING DRASTIC" NEEDS TO HAPPEN

At the present time, many members of Egypt's business sector feel alienated from the political system. As they see the world and their own region changing in ways that present them with new opportunities, they are increasingly frustrated with the restrictions, incompetence, obstructions, and corruption that hamper their ability to bring Egypt into competitive stride with the rest of the world.

"Certain economic steps have to be taken. They are so clear and so basic. . . Yet we will not be able to implement them because they will be a political inconvenience to the government," said Egyptian investment banker Mostafa Nahas in an interview. "The government has to decide, 'Is the political safety of the ruling class of Egypt more important than Egypt? Are we [Egyptians] here to serve the government or is the government here to serve the population?'"

Like many other businessmen in Egypt, Nahas says he is frustrated with the ignorance of government officials. "When you call in the private sector to talk to them, you have to be conversant enough with the rules of economic development. . . with economic facts. I don't think [government officials] are even competent enough to carry on such a conversation," said Nahas. "You'd be shocked. . . . What they are good for is creating a huge bureaucracy and keeping it running. Do they have the capacity to hear, understand, and act? I honestly don't think they have that capacity. Business feels it's a waste of time" talking to government officials. "The future is bleak with the existing system. I think my country deserves better. I know it could do better. . . if the government had more competent people, who were more interested in Egypt's interests rather than their own interests," the American-educated Nahas added.

"We are going backwards, unfortunately," said another businessman in Cairo. "You can't run a country. . . if you don't read analyses, if you don't know what is going on." Similar complaints are heard from Egyptian-born businessmen living abroad, who say they would invest at home if they had confidence that the system is changing. So far they are not convinced. "The government has no development plan," said another member of the Egyptian-American Businessmen Association. He decried a tendency by the Egyptian government to see economic reform as a matter of giving "private concessions" to favored businessmen rather than embarking on the "collective development" of the country's infrastructure and economic institutions.

All this is not to say that the business community holds the panacea for Egypt's slow-burning political crisis—a crisis caused by a political system lacking popular legitimacy and beset by violent attacks from Islamic militants. Indeed, Egypt's private sector is still

young and still unaccustomed to thinking beyond the narrow confines of corporate bottom lines. It still must learn to think in terms of the country's long-term economic development.

"I don't think private business has yet crystallized a concept which will make a bigger role possible. All they want is more tax holidays. They have not developed a political culture on their own," said Bashir, the former Sadat spokesman. The absence of any readily identifiable successor to Mubarak from Egypt's business community is an indication of this lack of a political culture. Most Egyptians still imagine a successor emerging from the military or from the ranks of the Islamic movement.

Yet some businessmen are already looking beyond today and hoping to play a bigger role in Egypt's future. During their meeting at the Metropolitan Club, Wahba told his fellow members and guests that "Egypt is in flux. You could not pick a better time for influencing it." He also noted that for the panel discussion on investing in Egypt, "We did not invite any government representative, nor did we want to do it at this time."

Many Egyptian businessmen feel that the task of

creating a new relationship between government and business is an urgent one. "Whether they like it or not, there are facts, there are currents of history," said a senior official of a major state-run industry who understands better than many of his peers the stakes involved in this latest challenge to the Egyptian government. "People have to get jobs. And one of the few [ways to accomplish this] is to have better cooperation between government and business. It's the only way. The only good chance for [the government] is to make use of the good intentions of Egyptian businessmen now," he said. The recent violence by Islamic militants, he added, "is a warning. Will the government at the high levels get the message or not? Do they get the message that something drastic has to be done in the country?"

Whether that "something drastic" will lead to a new and more productive partnership between government and business depends on how well, and how quickly, those long in power can adapt to changing times. Or, as Professor Richards put it, "The real question in Egypt is, Can the leopard change its spots?" ■

Questions about the viability of Palestinian self-rule have become for many one question: what about Hamas? "Like all politicians, Hamas leaders want positions of power in the Palestine National Authority. And there is ample room for their inclusion... Once included, once recognized as legitimate players, they will develop a vested interest in stabilizing the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. Above all, their inclusion will make them Arafat's partners in the self-rule government and in Arafat's deal with Israel."

Arafat's Dilemma

BY MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

In a discussion of local Palestinian politics with representatives from refugee camps in the Gaza Strip last summer, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat was asked about his understanding of democracy. His answer: "Democracy is respect for the Palestine National Authority." Of course, Arafat resides at the top of this authority—an authority he is trying to create that is supposed to govern the areas of the West Bank and Gaza that have been granted autonomy by Israel.¹

In response to another question at the same meeting, Arafat suggested that if his critics are not happy with his politics, they "can go and drink the water of the sea." He reiterated that obedience to the national authority should be every Palestinian's top priority.

Some of this is vintage Arafat; some, however, touches on fundamental issues of governance that have been debated by the Palestinian community in Palestine and the diaspora. Central here has been the question of building political institutions that include elections and full participation—in other words, the question of inclusion, of accepting the electoral participation of every Palestinian regardless of political orientation or his or her loyalty to Arafat.

Palestinians do not discuss this issue according to a theory of democracy that defines a democratic form of

government in terms of sources of authority for government, procedures for establishing government, and functions performed by government. It is discussed instead from a commonsense perspective that defines as democratic a system in which decision makers are selected through popular elections and in which political appointments are made on the basis of merit rather than loyalty to the man at the helm.

This focus on practical democracy can be partially explained by the Palestinians' observation of democracy at work in their daily contacts with Israeli society even as they were exposed to the brutalities of the occupation—even though the Israeli government denied them the benefits of the democratic process. Moreover, programs of political pluralization have been launched in recent years in a number of Arab countries, including Jordan; where Palestinians make up a majority of the population.

Twenty-seven years of Israeli occupation also helped a generation of Palestinian activists to become more independent minded, to think aloud, and to seriously debate the issues confronting them. This is a generation that not only refuses to be cajoled or coerced but has also acquired political organizing and networking skills in neighborhoods, refugee camps, Israeli jails, and above all, in the political bodies created during the intifada (uprising). Many of this generation's political bosses believe they are legitimate claimants to senior positions in the Palestine National Authority: they are, after all, graduates of Israeli jails, insiders who bore the brunt of occupation.

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ARAFAT ENCOUNTERED

On the eve of Arafat's return to Gaza and Jericho on July 1, local politics in the occupied territories was loosely controlled by competing groups of political activists who represented various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Hamas-dominated Islamic movement was based in Gaza and had well-organized branches throughout the territories. The

MUHAMMAD MUSLIH is an associate professor of political science and Middle Eastern studies at C. W. Post College, Long Island University. His works on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab politics include *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), and, with Augustus Richard Norton, *Political Tides in the Arab World* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1992). He is currently completing a book on Israeli-Syrian relations since 1948. This article is based on field research last summer in the West Bank and Gaza.

¹The combined land area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is approximately 2,300 square miles, but so far the Palestinians exercise self-rule only in Gaza (141 square miles) and portions of the 146-square-mile Jericho district, including the town itself.

balance of power, however, fell to Arafat's mainstream Fatah faction of the PLO.

Next in political influence came Hamas, led by Sheik Ahmad Yasir, followed by narrowly based leftist groups including George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In addition, one found the popular committees, or voluntary mass organizations, which had begun to emerge after 1976 in the form of unions and social service groups that acted as parallel authorities to the Israeli occupation authorities; at one point some observers thought of these committees as nascent organs of a PLO power base.

Arafat's arrival in the autonomous Palestinian areas brought to the fore deep-seated suspicions about his willingness to accommodate the opinions not only of his sharpest critics but also his staunchest supporters. In the eyes of his critics, Arafat was a captive of his agreement with Israel as much as he was a captive of his authoritarian style of politics. Hamas and other groups critical of Arafat and his deal with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had one aim: to undermine Arafat and poke holes in the agreement without causing bloodshed among the Palestinians.

Fatah itself was split by power struggles initiated by a growing number of young Fatah activists who were trying to gain positions of power in local society, in the process challenging the older generation of Fatah leaders. Many of these younger aspirants, active in the intifada and leaders in the neighborhoods of their communities, graduates of Israeli jails, felt themselves entitled to positions in the structures Arafat was trying to create. Their political ambitions were expressed with particular emphasis by Fatah cadres released from Israeli prisons in the mid-1980s, and again after the signing of the Israeli-PLO agreement in September 1993. Many of these cadres were corrupt street bosses averse to playing the political game by accepted rules. Some engaged in political assassinations, while others did not miss a chance to flex their muscle and impose their will on local neighborhoods in the absence of government authority.

With the launching of the intifada in December 1987, the Israeli occupation authorities had gradually disengaged from the day-to-day administration of the Palestinian territories, except for security matters and settlement and land-confiscation activities. This left the political field wide open for the Fatah street bosses, many of whom come from poorer families, have modest educational backgrounds, and are not socially prominent. But Fatah also includes a group of leaders set apart from the street bosses in four important ways.

These leaders' standing in local Palestinian society is a function of their personal integrity and their consistent struggle against the occupation. Many have been active in Fatah since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, or even earlier, and so are well known in local society. They tend to be more disci-

plined than the street bosses, better versed in the art of political organization, and are more apt to be engaged in sophisticated political discussions. Finally, members of this group had strong ties with the PLO leadership in Tunis; when not in prison they had acted as intermediaries between the PLO and the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Arafat's arrival in Gaza and Jericho, along with those PLO officials allowed in by the Israelis, did away with the need for an intermediary between the PLO leadership and Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza. The positions of power occupied by the leaders of the two local Fatah groups were no longer so solid, and their future became uncertain. This set the stage for rivalry between the local leaderships and the Tunis-based leadership. Ideological conflicts were not at the root of this; desire for political power was. And though some of the local Fatah leaders were at the top of Fatah's hierarchy in the West Bank and Gaza, none came close to enjoying Arafat's prestige, let alone Arafat's position at the national level.

Their future unsure, local leaders had to scramble for their political survival. One crucial prerequisite was direct access to Arafat, through which one might win his sympathy. This, however, proved a difficult task for many of the local leaders. To reach Arafat they had to wrestle with the cronies he had brought from Tunis, who have tried to block locals' access to the chairman with the aim of keeping all political privileges to themselves and becoming the only political force on which Arafat could depend in creating a Palestinian state.

This was the environment in which Arafat found himself on his return to Palestine. But part of Arafat—indeed, an important part—had already died before his return. The chairman's primacy within the PLO had been seriously compromised as a result of the secret negotiations that had led to the September 13, 1993, agreement with the Rabin government. The relationship with the masses that the charismatic Arafat had enjoyed during the bright youthful days of Amman and Beirut was diminished by the concessions he made to Israel. Arafat would stand at the helm not as a revolutionary resister but as a subdued figure, a symbol of Palestinian nationalism—an indication of the will to build a state.

WHAT THE PALESTINIANS WANT

Gaza and Jericho have become Arafat's principal arena, but he also has to worry about the wider Palestinian theater. Thus there are really a number of Palestinian agendas he must attend to. One is that of the diaspora Palestinians who feel the Israeli-PLO agreement ignores their concerns (primarily their right to return to their homes within pre-1967 Israel); another is that of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, whose overriding priority is to rid themselves of

all vestiges of Israeli occupation; a third is the agenda of the opposition, which presents an obstacle to Arafat's ambition to keep power concentrated in his hands. Compounding Arafat's difficulties is Rabin's strategy of extracting unreciprocated concessions from a wounded leader, thus undermining the chairman's authority even among some of his most loyal supporters.

But the wind has been blowing from all directions since Arafat's return. The call of radical Palestinian rejectionists for the abrogation of the agreement with Israel and the reigniting of the intifada represents one extreme. The disenchanted and alienated within Fatah criticize their chief—in many cases openly. Then there are the Arafat supporters who feel their hero has gone too far in alienating so many people. All three groups are united, however, in their calls for democratization. Six principal ideas govern this call:

- The PLO executive committee, its chairman (Arafat), its central council, and its bureaucracy should not be arbitrarily superimposed on the Palestine National Authority, or on the limited local self-government the Palestinians will be allowed to establish as an interim measure under the Israeli-PLO agreement.
- The pro-democracy political culture embraced by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza must replace the autocracy and paternalism of Arafat and the Tunis-based Palestinian leaders.
- The institutions created or about to be created by Arafat should protect human rights and individual liberties, and should be staffed on the basis of merit and not patronage.
- The political field should be open to every Palestinian. A constitution drafted by delegates elected specifically for the purpose should have primacy over the concerns and interests of entrenched elites.
- All authority should flow from the people and should be exercised by elected bodies. This is the only way to assure the creation of government bodies and leadership styles suited to nation building.
- Arafat should take orders from one master—the Palestinian people—and not from Rabin or any other party or quarter.

Arafat did not seem to understand these demands and made no real attempts to share power or solicit the opinions of others. He was unable or unwilling to change the symbols and style of a regime that had

alienated so many Palestinians. Instead of following a policy of inclusion, he excluded not only the opposition but also local Palestinians who had acted as his proxies before his return; he had promised he would be the leader of all Palestinians, but acted only like the president of his trusted lieutenants. Instead of speaking the language of tolerance and political pluralism, he spoke of respect for his authority. Indeed, immediately after the signing of the agreement with Israel, the PLO security chief and ambassador to Tunis, Hasan Balawi, told Israeli television, 'We will crush the opposition.' Along with this perpetuation of the old political culture, whose hallmarks are corruption and patronage, went other troubling signs that raised more questions about Arafat's ability to adapt to a new era and a new political environment.

CHARTER OF AN AUTOCRAT?

Last May 28 Arafat announced the appointment of 16 of the 24 members that were to sit on the Palestine National Authority. Half the portfolios were assigned to diaspora Palestinians. Eight went to Fatah, including the presidency and the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The distribution underlined Fatah's dominant role, with supreme authority resting in the hands of Arafat.

There was nothing wrong with this if one kept in mind that Fatah is the backbone of the Palestine National Movement and Arafat the uncontested national leader who is viewed as the embodiment of Palestinian nationalism. Few were happy with the appointments, but there was no major protest in response, except by the opposition. In selecting his security chiefs, Arafat filled the posts—far more important than conventional ministerial slots—with loyalists whose professional qualifications are below average and whose reputations are tarnished. Other appointments brought more and more Palestinians to the conclusion that Arafat was mired in the past, and that he would continue to follow the script he had prepared long ago.

An earlier worrisome sign was the PLO draft for a new charter for Palestinian self-rule, meant to be a proto-constitution. Released in December 1993 and twice revised in the next two months, the charter appeared in February in a form that allowed critics and even some supporters to say that it represented only a slight turn from autocratic leadership and toward political pluralization. The document, which is not yet operational, includes a section on civil liberties that elaborates the substantive and procedural aspects of these liberties. It also guarantees citizens the right to participate in the political and economic spheres in the territory.

But two aspects of the charter are not reassuring. The first—which civil libertarians found particularly

troubling—is the equivocal language when it comes to the protection of civil liberties. For example, articles 14 and 17, which guarantee freedom of expression and political activity, also impose an open-ended restriction on these freedoms—namely the strong protection of the reputation of individuals and groups. Such provisions would provide the Palestinian authority with a legal pretext to harass and silence individuals or groups that might disagree with its policies.

If it wished, the government could even crush the opposition in the name of protecting its reputation. In July, Arafat ordered the closure of *Al-Nahar*, the pro-Jordanian Arabic daily published in East Jerusalem, and banned distribution of it in the self-rule areas. The official reason was that the paper did not have a license from the Palestine National Authority. But privately, Arafat suggested the paper was overly sympathetic to Jordan, clearly indicating that he will not tolerate any deviation from the path he charts.

The second troubling aspect of the charter is the ambiguity surrounding the form of government. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches are confusingly interwoven, and the mass is difficult to disentangle. A careful reading of the document reveals that the president of the Palestine National Authority, who is not to be directly elected, will reign supreme, and that he is vested with powers inconsistent with the principles of democratic government. Once the charter goes into effect the president will be empowered to preside over the legislative process and the supreme court and will appoint the chief justice. In addition, the charter grants the president the extraconstitutional powers contained in the 1964–1968 basic laws of the PLO and its executive committee. Under this system there are no checks and balances, and if the president wishes, he can control the entire machinery of government.

These steps taken by Arafat's fledgling government represent only one side of its response to the call for accountability and pluralization. How it has tried to deal with the question of law and order is the other side of the response.

Rabin expects the Palestine National Authority to succeed where Israel's military and intelligence services have failed. In other words, he wants Arafat to ensure the security of Israeli settlers and Israeli soldiers against attacks by Hamas or other Palestinian groups. Rather condescendingly, the Israeli prime minister notes that the Palestinians do not yet have a supreme court and assumes that, unlike him, Arafat is not restrained by pressure from his people, including Palestinian civil rights groups.

The chaos that accompanied the intifada made the imposition of law and order the paramount concern for Palestinians in the occupied territories. This is why they welcomed the PLO-derived police force when it was deployed in Gaza and Jericho in May. True, some

Palestinians feared Arafat might use the Palestinian police force as an instrument of repression, but in general the response in the territories was positive. Until the November clashes between the police and Islamic groups in Gaza, about 70 percent of Palestinians gave the police a good grade for their performance; even a majority of Hamas supporters approved of the force. Moreover, the Israeli military command expressed satisfaction with its performance.

Caught between Rabin, who wants him to quell the Islamic groups and curtail the activities of the secular opposition, and his own people, who want him to give top priority to their interests and to the question of political freedom, there is little Arafat can do but juggle. He is not completely free even in the territory from which the Israeli army has departed. Israeli troops still man checkpoints at the entrances to Gaza and Jericho, next to Palestinian policemen who man separate checkpoints. The Palestine National Authority does not have the authority to allow diaspora Palestinians to enter without Israel's prior consent. Every move, every remark Arafat makes is microscopically scrutinized by Israel. Worse, Arafat constantly has to prove to Israel that he is credible and trustworthy.

Economically, the autonomous areas are also hostage to Israel. Approximately 90 percent of imports come from Israel and between 70 percent and 80 percent of exports go to Israel. About a quarter of the population of the autonomous areas is supported by family members who work in Israel; however, these workers do not always have the permits necessary to enter Israel, since it is difficult to get them from the Israeli authorities. Airports, seaports, and other transit facilities are under Israeli control.

Thus Arafat has to serve two masters: his people and the Israeli government. If he listens too much to the Palestinian people, his credibility will suffer in the eyes of Israel; if he accommodates Israeli desires he will lose his people, and thus his claim to legitimacy. So far Arafat has managed to exclude the opposition from the government that he is trying to create. He even tried to clamp down on Hamas and Islamic Holy War, first by detaining some members after the Hamas bombing of a civilian bus in Tel Aviv in October, and in November by trying to quell by force the protests of their supporters in Gaza.

Arafat has done this not only because he is disinclined to share power but also because he wants to prove to Rabin that he is at the helm—that he can deliver, and is entitled to Rabin's trust and the trust of the Americans. But sooner or later Arafat will have to return to his constituency if he wants to remain in command at home. He has to reclaim his standing among the Palestinians, include all political groups in his government, and establish institutions that will facilitate the process of nation building.

Above all, Arafat has to incorporate Hamas in the

Palestine National Authority. The alternative is to fight, but this would be a disastrous choice since it would severely disrupt the building of a Palestinian state. No force can destroy Hamas because Hamas is much more than just an opposition group: Hamas is a sentiment; it is an index of Palestinian frustration with Arafat's leadership style and with Israel's continued attempts to dominate the Palestinians.

Moreover, Hamas is not monolithic. Nor is it a group motivated simply by religion. First and foremost Hamas is a political movement, and within it there are moderate elements willing to strike a deal with Arafat as well as with Rabin. Arafat's situation is an invitation to Rabin to realize that Israel's interests are in many ways intertwined with those of the Palestinians, and that driving Arafat to exclude the opposition hurts the cause of peace on which the prime minister's 1992 election campaign was based.

Just as the inclusion of the PLO in a partnership of peace with Israel led to the Israeli-Jordanian peace

treaty last October, and to Israel's entry into a formal relationship with a number of Arab countries, the inclusion of Hamas and other groups in the structures of the Palestine National Authority will lead to a stable order in the self-rule areas. Like all politicians, Hamas leaders want positions of power in the Palestine National Authority. And there is ample room for their inclusion in the Palestinian government. Once included, once recognized as legitimate players, they will develop a vested interest in stabilizing the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. Above all, their inclusion will make them Arafat's partners in the self-rule government and in Arafat's deal with Israel.

Ultimately this is the responsibility of the Palestinians. But Rabin can and should help by treating Arafat with the kind of respect that befits a national leader and a peace partner, by allowing the Palestinians to be free in their own domain, and by expediting the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the rest of the self-rule areas. ■

There is no obvious remedy for this dilemma, only recognition that continuing terrorism may well make further pursuit of the peace process impossible. . . Rabin and Arafat, who once symbolized the conflict of absolute contradiction, are now united: they will either succeed or fail together.

Rabin and Arafat: Alone, Together

BY MARK A. HELLER

Elections in Israel, as in most democratic countries, are normally a referendum on the incumbent government. While foreign and security affairs play an especially prominent role in Israeli elections, domestic issues are never entirely absent and can sometimes make a critical difference. A sense of general malaise and a desire to punish the "ins," especially among new immigrants dissatisfied with their treatment by government, for example, helped turn Likud out of office in 1992, and economic discontent, particularly over rapidly rising housing prices, could do the same to Labor in 1996. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the outcome of the next elections will be tied more strongly than usual to the public's assessment of the government's policies toward Israel's Arab neighbors.

This linkage is partly circumstantial; if the schedule outlined in the 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles is met, negotiations over permanent status arrangements will begin just as the election campaign moves into high gear. The timing may have been coincidental, but the result is that the 1996 elections will provide the Israeli public with its first opportunity to express authoritatively its views on the peace process under Labor. Its verdict will decide not only the political fate of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor government, but also the future of the peace process itself. If this verdict is negative, the immediate casualties will probably include PLO chairman Yasir Arafat as well. Of course, Arafat will not just be a passive bystander; what he does or does not do in the interim will certainly affect the outcome. In this sense he is an active participant in the Israeli electoral system, and this political fact links him with Rabin in ways that neither may have intended but that neither

can now escape. In short, the fates of these two leaders and the peace process itself are inextricably intertwined.

A WHIPSAW WAR

It is impossible to predict whether this fate will be cruel or kind; the past year was too full of ambiguities and contradictions to produce anything more than profound ambivalence. For most of this period the Israeli public was on an emotional roller-coaster, thrown between the celebration of political breakthroughs and the anguish of terrorist outrages. A firm sense of direction has not yet emerged in the middle ground between these conflicting emotions; attitudes are volatile and almost certain to continue to fluctuate until voters cast their ballots. But if any underlying trend can be discerned, it is that the optimism spawned by the accord with the Palestinians has become more guarded, and concern has given way to serious apprehension:

Stripped to its bare essentials, the reason is that the benefits of peace, especially relief from the pervasive sense of personal insecurity, have not yet materialized. The signing of the accord brought only a brief respite in terror attacks, and the following year was punctuated by a series of drive-by shootings and snipings, the kidnapping and killing of an Israeli soldier, assaults on Israeli military positions in Gaza, and the suicide bombing of three buses in Israel. By the end of last November, 100 Israelis had been killed and hundreds more wounded in attacks since the ceremony on the White House lawn.

In most cases direct responsibility for these attacks lies with Islamic radicals in the Palestinian camp— Hamas and Islamic Holy War. But Arafat, by virtue of his inability or unwillingness to repress terror and his occasional lapses into pre-Washington modes of discourse, is often perceived by the Israeli public as a co-conspirator. Ultimately, however, these failures are laid at the door of the Israeli government, which stands accused of failing to keep an implicit bargain with its own public.

MARK A. HELLER is a senior research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. His publications include *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) and, with Sari Nusseibeh, *No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).

What is the nature of that bargain? The government was not pushed into its agreement with the PLO by a restive public. There were, of course, signs of impatience with the stagnation of the Madrid process that had begun in October 1991, and there was pressure to do something about the acts of terrorism recurring with only slightly less frequency than before the accord. But the specific solution—negotiations with the PLO leading to an agreement on self-government in the West Bank and Gaza—was a government initiative, carried out secretly and presented only afterward for public endorsement. In other words, the government did not follow public opinion but led, and to justify its departure from long-standing Labor policy toward the PLO it had to persuade the Israeli public about the advantages of this course of action. That the opposition could not suggest anything that had not already been tried and found wanting helped; nevertheless, the agreement clearly prefigured some major Israeli concessions following a wrenching domestic debate, and that part of the public prepared to contemplate this outcome had to be assured there would be some palpable benefits in return. These benefits can be reduced to two: a peace dividend, meaning some material gain and psychopolitical gratification through the normalization of Israel's status regionally and internationally, and an improvement (or at the very least, avoidance of a further deterioration) in the personal security of Israelis.

In the face of domestic criticism, governments are tempted to take the path of least resistance and claim they gave little in an agreement with an adversary and received much. The Labor government did not stoop to the level of misrepresentation, but neither did it do much to dispel misunderstandings about an intrinsically complicated and problematic agreement. Perhaps there was not much it could do in a popular and necessarily simplistic public debate to clarify the distinction between the immediate reality and the future promise of the agreement, but the fact that in popular usage the declaration was often referred to as a "peace agreement" (rather than as an agreed process that will hopefully culminate in peace) reflects the confused and unrealistic expectations that prevailed in the Israeli public.

Of the two types of anticipated benefits, the peace dividend has been much more in evidence. The Israel-PLO agreement provided what the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty could not: a fulcrum to begin dismantling the wall of isolation, ostracism, boycott, and embargo separating Israel from the rest of the Arab world. The barriers, of course, did not collapse entirely. Beyond the substantive differences that still precluded a settlement with Syria and, by extension, Lebanon, there was ample evidence that both publics and governments in the Arab world remained either apprehensive about or altogether hostile to the idea of

normalizing relations with Israel. Even Egypt—which welcomed the expansion of Israeli-Arab relations because its own ties with Israel had made it a regional anomaly for 15 years—complicated the process by injecting unrealistic demands about Israeli policy on nuclear nonproliferation in every regional and international forum.

THE PEACE DIVIDENDS

Nevertheless, there were a number of breakthroughs. Israeli political figures, diplomats, and tourists were openly received in Tunisia and Morocco, and both countries agreed to open diplomatic offices in Tel Aviv. Israeli negotiators, including ministerial-level delegates, traveled to Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain to participate in multilateral meetings on water, arms control, and the environment. There were even reports of an Iraqi *démarche* to Israel, though any real movement in Iraqi-Israeli relations is impossible until UN sanctions against Iraq are rescinded. Israel also became the subject of more honest journalistic coverage with the arrival of reporters from Algeria and several Gulf states. Even Syria's hermetic boycott of all things Israeli was slightly relaxed when two Israeli media correspondents (who also held American passports) were allowed to enter and report from Damascus; in late 1994, it was also revealed that most Syrian Jews—including all those who desired to do so—had been permitted to emigrate.

On the economic front, Israeli-Egyptian trade and cooperation intensified after many years of stagnation, and Israeli business contacts in the Gulf were increasingly acknowledged and publicized. Direct economic ties with Israel were not yet formally authorized by the Gulf states, but last September, the Gulf Cooperation Council declared that its members would no longer boycott companies that had traded with or invested in Israel; Gulf officials and businessmen also took a highly visible role at the November Middle East and North Africa business summit held in Morocco. Israeli relations with Islamic countries farther afield also expanded. While there were still no formal ties with Indonesia, this may well be the logical direction of developments that included Prime Minister Rabin's visit to Jakarta and his meeting with President Suharto, and the accelerated pace of journalistic and academic exchanges. Israel had long had official but low-level ties with Turkey, but last year economic relations increased dramatically and the upgrading of diplomatic relations culminated in the first visit to Israel of a Turkish prime minister.

The most dramatic development of all, of course, was the peace agreement signed with Jordan in October. The Hashemite Kingdom's basic inclination to make peace with Israel was no surprise. This objective, explicitly incorporated in the Israeli-Jordanian Declaration of Principles formulated in 1992 but never offi-

cially adopted, had informed most of King Hussein's secret and public diplomacy during the previous two decades, including the London Agreement negotiated with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in 1987 but disavowed by Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, this orientation can be traced back to Hussein's grandfather, King Abdallah, who was assassinated by Palestinians in 1951 because of his conciliatory approach toward Israel. Furthermore, the decades of formal belligerency between Jordan and Israel were never marked by the same sense of deep hostility or fundamental contradiction of essence or interests that had characterized the attitude of most other Arab parties toward Israel; the general Israeli perception was that Hussein (like his grandfather) was not really an enemy in the emotive sense, but rather a dignified and trustworthy adversary who sometimes played a significant role in the overall Arab threat but whose heart was never really in the conflict.

But all the efforts to translate this tendency into a formal and overt state of peace had foundered on the Palestinian factor. The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles robbed this obstacle of much of its potency—that, in fact, was one reason many Palestinians were so ambivalent about the declaration—and it enabled Jordan, once the Palestinians had abandoned the pretense of “Arab coordination,” to do precisely the same. There is no better symbol of this dynamic than the fact that one day after the signing of the Israel-PLO declaration in Washington, Jordan felt able to retrieve from cold storage its own declaration with Israel and give it formal effect in a similar (albeit much more modest) signing ceremony.

The Jordanian “track” was not absolutely disconnected from events west of the Jordan River; premature publicity temporarily slowed progress as Israel and the PLO faced difficulties translating their framework agreement into operational details—especially after the February killing of 29 Palestinians in Hebron by an Israeli settler. The signing of the Cairo agreement on self-rule in Gaza and Jericho in May eliminated the last remaining barrier, and actually prodded King Hussein to reintensify negotiations to preempt even closer Israeli-PLO coordination and preserve some Jordanian influence on the West Bank. Consequently, differences on bilateral issues between Jordan and Israel—particularly the question of water rights and the disposition of a few small parcels of land—were rapidly resolved. The agreement was finally consummated at a festive signing ceremony in the Arava Valley, which immediately became the first official border-crossing point between Israel and Jordan.

Unlike the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Jordanian-Israeli peace did not require wrenching Israeli concessions nor did it constitute an absolute departure from previous relations. Instead, it was perceived as the materialization of a historical logic, and therefore

provoked less shock and induced less euphoria in the Israeli public. For the same reasons, however, it promised much more in terms of warmth, human contact, and genuine reconciliation—Jordan, too, seemed to want peace for its own sake rather than as an instrument to extract concessions from Israel—and the Israeli response, though less giddy than in 1979, reflected a more solid sense of gratification and confidence that this peace was real.

THE UNEASY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

This achievement, like the others under the rubric of “the peace dividend,” emanated from the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles. Israelis should therefore have been far more enthusiastic about the process. The reality, however, has been quite different. Occasional diplomatic achievements have instead provided only brief respite from an increasingly anxious, even surly public mood. Many Israelis believe that the centerpiece of the process—the restructuring of relations with the Palestinians—is not working and that the second anticipated benefit—relief from personal insecurity—is not going to occur. For most, these failings more than outweigh any gains in Israel's regional and international status.

The obstacles to a smooth implementation of the declaration are not mysterious. The agreement itself is full of lacunae and inconsistencies; the political need to postpone negotiation of the most problematic substantive issues complicates the effective treatment of interim problems, and the experiment in self-government, which is conceived of as a confidence-building measure for both sides, is being carried out in Gaza and the Jericho enclave. While Jericho was included as political window dressing to signify the application of the declaration to the West Bank and presented no special challenge once its geographical contours were agreed, Gaza was precisely where social and economic circumstances provided the least promising prospects for success.

Because of serious differences, especially over security and border-crossing points, there was some slippage from the target dates specified in the accord. An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho, to be negotiated by December 1993, was not concluded until May, but the implementation of the withdrawal, scheduled to extend over four months, was accelerated so that Israeli troops actually left Jericho and Gaza (except for Jewish settlements there) and transferred civilian authority to the Palestinians only about a month behind schedule. Six weeks later, after a Palestinian police force was in place, Arafat himself arrived in Gaza.

The transition from globe-trotting revolutionary statesman to chief governor and administrator was not an easy one for Arafat. After decades spent pursuing symbolic and emotional victories through the use of

rhetoric, diplomacy, and violence, Arafat could not yet claim that the objects of Palestinian desire—liberation, independence, Jerusalem, return—had been achieved. He had not been able to satisfy hopes for the quick release of all Palestinian prisoners. Most critically, he now found himself saddled with a new kind of burden: direct responsibility for the welfare of over 800,000 people, the majority living in conditions of poverty, overcrowding, underemployment, and crumbling infrastructure, but with high expectations of imminent improvement in their fortunes.

The PLO-dominated Palestinian National Authority is ill-equipped to respond to this daunting challenge. It is hampered by interfactional rivalries, friction between local residents and PLO functionaries brought from abroad to staff the bureaucracies, and by an organizational culture that produces a closed, highly centralized decision-making process. Because of the PNA's failure to establish mechanisms for transparency and accountability, financial transfers by donor countries and international institutions such as the World Bank have fallen far short of the amounts pledged. Funding shortfalls have complicated Arafat's efforts to bring about any real improvement in the material conditions of Gazans, thereby further undermining his popularity and legitimacy. The political beneficiaries of this have been the radical Islamist forces, whose war against Israel and opposition to Arafat's policy have left them, unlike Arafat, uncompromised by the inevitable gap between hopes and reality.

Terrorism produced a second type of vicious cycle that also benefited the Islamist opposition: after almost every attack against Israelis, the Israeli government, pressed to show that it was doing something to fight terrorism, closed off the territories from Israel. This brought some temporary relief for Israelis, but the consequence in the territories, especially in Gaza, was to deprive thousands of families of their only source of livelihood, thus exacerbating the economic desperation and creating even more fertile ground for radical forces and the violence they advocate. For these reasons, as well as the continuing reliance of some Israeli employers on Gaza labor, the closures rarely lasted more than a few days, but before they were lifted they further discredited the PLO and the peace process it represented.

Four months after Arafat entered Gaza, the tensions caused by administrative failings, economic frustrations, and the multiple pressures on the PLO chairman boiled over into a confrontation between Palestinian police and crowds surging out of the Palestine Mosque following Friday prayers. After the police opened fire, killing 16 demonstrators and wounding more than 100 others, Gaza seemed on the brink of civil war. This danger was averted, at least temporarily, by an agreement between the PNA and the Islamic opposition that was reached through the intervention of some Israeli

Arab mediators. But the durability of any *modus vivendi* between the PLO and the Islamic opposition remains very much in doubt, and the success or failure of the experiment called "Gaza-Jericho first" hangs in the balance.

THE DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF SELF-RULE

In short, the continuation of the entire process is highly uncertain. Late last year, the "early empowerment" provisions for the West Bank specified in the declaration were implemented when Israel formally transferred to the PNA responsibility for education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. But the major challenges of the interim agreement—redeployment of Israeli forces, elections, the installation of a Palestinian Council, and the implementation of full self-government—had yet to be broached, and the experience thus far, especially with respect to terrorism, had produced serious reservations about how best to proceed. Not surprisingly, the Israeli opposition insisted that its position had been vindicated: that the entire experiment was a failure and should be abandoned. Significantly, some members of the ruling coalition agreed with this conclusion, or at least believed it reflected public sentiment and that a decision to continue along the path prescribed by the declaration would cost Labor dearly at the polls. Unwilling to repudiate the entire process, they advocated a freeze on further movement until the flaws revealed thus far had been rectified.

A different approach was suggested by some in the coalition who believed that many of the problems, including Arafat's growing vulnerability, stemmed from the slow pace of the process and uncertainty about its ultimate direction. Since this uncertainty would pose a major obstacle to an interim agreement, these individuals proposed that Israel jump over the stage of self-government and move immediately to negotiations on permanent status. Accelerating these negotiations would not contradict the declaration, which simply stipulates that these commence "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period," (that is, by May 1996). But even if they began immediately, the sensitivity and complexity of the issues guaranteed that talks would go on for years, and some arrangement other than the status quo would meanwhile be required. In any case, there was little public support for this proposal; "Gaza-Jericho first" was conceived of as a confidence-building measure, but its effect had been precisely the opposite. Thus the bulk of the Labor Party occupied the middle ground: continue the course laid out in the declaration but look for some solution to the terrorism that threatened its viability.

At one level, the link that makes this terrorism a mortal threat to the peace process is not self-evident. The majority of the most horrific terrorist acts last year occurred or originated, not in Gaza, but in Israel or

areas still under Israeli control. But even if Gaza had been the location or source of these outrages, they would have provided a compelling reason for Israel to abandon the process only if the terrorists had enjoyed the support or connivance of the Palestinian National Authority. Otherwise, the most rational course of action was to pursue the process to its logical conclusion—permanent status arrangements and a peace agreement.

Prime Minister Rabin endorsed this rationale on several occasions, when he argued that halting the process would simply reward the terrorists; the most effective solution to terrorism was the complete separation of Israel from the territories. This presupposed a demarcation of the line dividing Israel from the territories, which inevitably means a decision on the status of Jerusalem and the settlements. Since Israel could not effectively contain terrorism by acting unilaterally on these issues—otherwise, it would have done so long ago—the only real option was negotiated agreements. But it was difficult to make this argument explicitly, since the political reality in Israel dictates the opposite sequence: only a prior resolution of the terrorism problem will permit the concessions required for a permanent status agreement.

There is no obvious remedy for this dilemma, only recognition that continuing terrorism may well make

further pursuit of the peace process impossible. The public may not yet be completely disillusioned, but it is likely to constrain the present government and, in certain circumstances, reject it and the basic approach it represents. Three days before the 1988 elections, the firebombing of a civilian bus near Jericho turned what was expected to be a Labor victory into a virtual tie and produced a Likud-led Government of National Unity. A steady drumbeat of terrorism until 1996 may so discredit the Labor government that no dramatic incident or last-minute shift of sentiment will be needed to ensure its defeat. If that happens, the outcome will please no one more than the Palestinian radicals who, acting in the name of Islam, had helped bring it about.

Avoiding this scenario is a huge challenge to all parties, but especially Rabin and Arafat. With determination, economic assistance, and some luck, they have a reasonable chance to succeed. But whatever the outcome, the nature of that challenge reflects the monumental transformation that has already taken place in Israeli-Palestinian relations. For Rabin and Arafat, who once symbolized the conflict of absolute contradiction, are now united: they will either succeed or fail together. ■

"In choosing to destroy his former partners in the unity government by military means rather than negotiating a solution, Ali Abdulla Saleh has led Yemen into further instability, bolstering the claim... that the regime will prevent Yemen from entering the twenty-first century."

Civil War in Yemen: The Price of Unity?

BY CHUCK SCHMITZ

The "seventy days" war in Yemen last April through July caught most off guard. Yemen's experiment with democracy, which began in 1990 when a unity agreement between North and South Yemen took effect, had brought a sense of freedom. Not only were elections held and a new parliament established, but the state security apparatus had loosened its grip on the political process. At least 46 fledgling parties were operating relatively uninhibited by the state or the ruling party, and more than 90 newspapers were in publication. Intellectuals engaged in lively debate in print and in social *qat* sessions as well as in parliament, seemingly with little concern for official views. Yemen appeared to be well on the way to a successful political renaissance.

But there were lingering difficulties. The most telling was that plans to unify the military units of the two former states were never carried out. In August 1993 Ali Salim al-Beidh, the former president of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), isolated himself in Aden and refused to join the government in Sana, the capital of the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). By fall it was apparent that Yemen's new institutions could not cope with the political struggle between the various factions.

In the winter of 1993 most still believed that a political solution was possible and indeed was desired by the country's leaders. The signing in February 1994 of a document that outlined steps to modernize the unified state seemed to indicate that differences could still be resolved peacefully, and when isolated fighting broke out that month between northern and southern units, political leaders appeared willing and able to contain it. Popular opinion was clearly against the military option; there were antiwar demonstrations and vigils in every major city. Why then did war break out, and what have the results of the north's victory been?

THE OIL BUBBLE AND THE UNITY BUBBLE

The political difficulties that led to war were intertwined with increasing economic woes. In the past 10 years Yemen has been forced to shift from an economy fueled mainly by the export of labor to one in which domestic resources have been called on to generate the bulk of earnings and growth. Historically, Yemen's harsh geography has forced many of its people to leave in search of a better living. With the dramatic rise in oil revenues in neighboring Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, this labor migration took on a new dimension. As much as one-third of Yemen's work force left to take jobs in other countries, primarily low-skilled construction jobs; up to three-quarters of Saudi Arabia's workers were Yemeni. Remittances from these workers powered a commercial boom in the Yemens, transforming them from a land of subsistence farmers to one of merchants and urban builders.

The heady days of seemingly limitless growth for the Arabian peninsula ended when oil prices plummeted in the mid-1980s. The oil economies were already "maturing" and their need for low-skilled construction labor had begun to decline, but the drop in oil prices further trimmed construction budgets and slowed Yemeni remittances. In North Yemen the government soon faced a fiscal crisis, to which it responded with a successful program of fiscal austerity and strict controls on foreign trade. Merchants now had to obtain an import license from the state, and the central government gained tight control over foreign exchange, jailing money changers and doling out hard currency to favored businesses.

In Marxist South Yemen, the decline in oil remittances and general economic downturn coincided with the most serious upheaval since the regime came to power in the late 1960s. Factional struggles within the leadership degenerated in January 1986 into a full-scale military conflict that lasted two weeks. Though the "events of 1986" had political and social roots that went deeper than the economic changes the region was going through, the timing of the upheaval owed much

CHUCK SCHMITZ, a Fulbright scholar in Yemen in the months before the war, is currently writing his doctoral dissertation on the country at the University of California at Berkeley.

to dislocations in the economy. In both North and South Yemen, leaders confronted the fact that the era of growth buoyed by money from workers abroad was over.

The 1990 unity agreement between the two states was designed to address Yemen's future in the changing regional economy. The discovery of oil in the border regions of Marib and Shabwa in the mid-1980s gave northern and southern leaders an incentive to create a stable environment for investment in oil production. A joint investment zone along the border was agreed on in 1985, though the turmoil of January 1986 in South Yemen postponed its implementation. But when political tensions between the two states led to the massing of troops along both sides of the border in 1987, negotiations were renewed; both north and south realized that conflict would prohibit development of the new resources that represented the only bright spot in the Yemeni economy.

The unification of Yemen promised other economic gains. Oil already in production in the north could go to South Yemen's refinery in Aden, generating significant income for the united state, and the creation of a free trade zone in Aden was seen as powering major growth. But the Persian Gulf War in early 1991 dimmed prospects for economic revival. While publicly condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Yemen, along with Jordan, insisted on an Arab solution to the crisis and rejected the actions of the United States-led alliance. This brought swift retribution from the Saudis, the staunchest supporter of the alliance in the Middle East, who unceremoniously expelled 800,000 Yemeni nationals. Yemen's financial lifeline was abruptly severed. Furthermore, all aid that had been extended to Yemen by the nations allied against Iraq—the Western countries, and the Arab nations of the "Damascus Declaration" (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states)—was withdrawn. Yemen's backing of Iraq also severely hampered the forging of critical trade agreements with its oil-rich neighbors. And access to markets in the oil states and investment capital from Yemeni expatriates there is key to any economic plan for Yemen.

Yemen's economy continued to collapse. Trade imbalances had exhausted the government's foreign exchange reserves. The state then lifted restrictions on imports and allowed any merchant with foreign currency to import. Government debt reached a level that prompted International Monetary Fund representatives to press officials for structural adjustment measures. Under the IMF adjustment plan, consumer subsidies on petroleum products, electricity, and basic imported food staples would have been removed; the fund also wanted the government to devalue the Yemeni currency, which was greatly overvalued. This plan would not have helped the government's standing in the eyes of consumers, since it would have exacer-

bated the decline in the standard of living of most Yemenis. Twice during the previous two years the major cities had seen riots sparked by the effects of inflation. In effect the unity government had failed to deliver on its economic promise.

THE SPLIT TICKET

The fragile political coalition that had achieved unity for Yemen fell apart. The unity agreement had stipulated that an interim government would be formed in 1990 by merging the institutions of the two former states; the two former ruling parties—the General People's Congress (GPC) of North Yemen and the south's Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)—would hold equal power. At the end of a two-year interim period, multiparty elections were to be held for parliament, a cabinet of ministers, and a presidential council; although balloting took place April 27, 1993, the new government was never consolidated. Ali Salim al-Beidh, the leader of the YSP and former southern head of state, refused to be sworn in as vice president of the Yemeni Republic. In August he returned to his old capital city, Aden, and refused to set foot in Sana, the capital of the united Yemen.

The main source of contention was the distribution of power between the two former ruling parties. Based on informal agreements between the two groups during the unity talks, the southern contingent believed that power in the new elected government would be shared equally by the rulers of the two former Yemens, in spite of the great demographic differences between the two states. (In 1986 the population of the north was about four and a half times that of the south—approximately 9 million inhabitants to the south's 2 million.) The YSP in fact did quite well in the elections, receiving 413,984 votes to 640,523 for the GPC and making substantial progress toward forging a constituency in the north. But when the victorious northerners brought Islah, a third party, into the governing coalition, the YSP felt it had been reduced to a junior partner.

This was all the more difficult for the YSP to accept since there had been significant development of oil reserves in the southern provinces during the interim period. Southerners believed that the benefits of the new oil—and, for that matter, all benefits of economic growth—would be distributed unevenly among Yemenis. At worst, they feared new sources of wealth would be squandered through corruption in the northern regime. Yemen's economic free fall rendered the southern argument especially poignant.

After the 1993 elections any informal power-sharing agreement that had existed broke down. Upset by what it saw as a northern attempt to annex the south, the YSP published a set of 18 points that were really conditions for its participation in government. A "political dialogue" committee eventually formed to negotiate between the parties. It produced the "Document of the

Agreement and Pact," which all major Yemeni leaders signed in Amman, Jordan, last February.

The signing crowned the YSP's efforts to build a coalition opposed to the regime of the new president, the former military dictator of the north, Ali Abdulla Saleh. The "Document" was calculated to bring into the political realm groups marginalized in the Yemen Arab Republic, and power in Sana is so narrowly held that there was no lack of these. The regime is led by Ali Abdulla Saleh and his fellow clansmen from Sanhan, an area just south of Sana. The major posts in the military and the security apparatus are stocked with "relatives" of the president. The regime builds its broader support among Hashid, one of the two main tribal confederations in the former North Yemen. Manipulation of tribal affiliations creates a favored minority loyal to the regime and reinforces tribal cleavages in Yemeni society.

The Yemeni Socialist Party thus aimed much of its rhetoric at Bakil, the other major tribal confederation in Yemen, a group larger than Hashid though less cohesive. But the YSP also courted nontribal groups in the southern highlands of the former Yemen Arab Republic, home to a majority of Yemen's professionals, academics, and businesspeople. The National Democratic Front, a YSP ally, was very strong in this area, the so-called "middle regions," in the late 1970s and early 1980s. After the defeat of an insurrection mounted by the front in 1982, many local leaders felt their interests were ignored in Sana since they no longer had a military force to represent them.

This opposition coalition forced Ali Abdulla Saleh to recognize the "Document," gaining them the upper hand in the public debate. But the president is an astute strategist, and is not to be outdone in the game of coalition building. Many Yemeni groups were either disillusioned with or openly hostile to the YSP, including the neo-Islamic right in the north and the south, disaffected tribes in the south, and former factions of the party itself that had been exiled by the leadership in Aden. The president united these on the basis of their opposition to the YSP, then proceeded to raise suspicions about the southern leadership and its intentions that weakened their opposing alliance.

Among the political Islamists ranged against the YSP, the most powerful group is the Yemeni Association for Reform, or Islah. This is a coalition composed of tribal leaders from the Hashid confederation, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and others radically opposed to the leading southern party. Islah was formed in the early 1980s by none other than Ali Abdulla Saleh as a counter to the leftist National Democratic Front, which controlled large areas of the southern highlands in what was then North Yemen. Islah's constituency is still mainly in the north, though it has made inroads against Islamic groups working in the southern provinces. In the south the Islamists

include mainstream organizations such as the Brotherhood, as well as more militant groups such as the one founded by Sheik Tareq, a Yemeni mujahideen returned from Afghanistan.

The second element in Ali Abdulla Saleh's coalition was the Ali Nasser Muhammad contingent. Ali Nasser was president of South Yemen from 1980 to 1986, and after the "events of 1986" he, along with tens of thousands of his followers, fled the People's Democratic Republic and took refuge in the north. Ali Nasser posed such a threat to the southern leadership that it insisted he leave Yemen as a condition of the 1990 unity agreement. But his military units and political cadre were allowed to remain behind, and many though not all of his men joined the forces of the north; the military chief of staff for the northern side during the war was a follower of Ali Nasser. Thus former top YSP officials fought against and helped defeat the south in last year's war.

The final linchpin of the northern coalition was disaffected tribal groups in the south, the most important among them the Awlaqi of Shabwa. The Awlaqi had a long-standing grudge against the YSP because of the party's treatment of them in South Yemen—which in turn stemmed from the role the Awlaqis had played in British military efforts during the struggle for independence. The defection of the Awlaqi would play an important part in the north's victory.

His anti-YSP coalition lined up, Ali Abdulla Saleh worked to counter his opponents' ideological campaign with charges that the YSP rejected the new constitution and the democratic process. The constitution had been forged in negotiations between the two leaderships and ratified in a popular referendum that was held in May 1991. Power in the governing coalition formed by the three largest parties was distributed based on the number of seats held in parliament. True, the president's party and its allies had a majority in all major policymaking bodies, but this was simply the spoils of the electoral process to which southerners had agreed. That the southern leadership was not cooperating with the new institutions meant that the southerners were a threat to the new state. It was the southerners, the north said, who were going back on their promises.

There was some truth to these accusations. The southern military was exclusively in the hands of men from the mountainous regions in Lahj, one of the six southern provinces. Efforts by the southern political leadership to broaden the social base of the regime with the participation of people from other areas of the south in the military and security apparatus had met with stiff resistance from officials in those institutions. Suspicions about the motives of the southern leadership weakened the alliance with northern opponents of the new Yemeni regime. Northern opposition interests wanted to take part in a movement to redefine the

balance of power in the unified state, but they would only lose by supporting southern secession. Within the upper reaches of the YSP, leaders from the north said they would not support a drive for secession, while the leaders of southern origin were less resistant to the idea. Southerners' frustrations with the regime of Ali Abdulla Saleh were largely channeled into attempts to reform the unified state, but some supported secession. At the outbreak of the war, though, the southern leadership was still firmly behind unity.

THE WAR FOR YEMEN

It is not clear which side started the war. Both were preparing for one, though the south was not ready for a full-scale conflict. This became evident when fighting broke out; the south's two best armored units, isolated in Amran and Dhamar, were destroyed in the first two days. In the north, security units quickly moved against leaders whose loyalty to Ali Abdulla Saleh was suspect, and Bakil and other tribal groups the YSP had courted remained neutral. The northern armed forces were free to concentrate on the remaining southern units in the south.

The southern leadership, disillusioned with its northern allies who were offering no military support, formed a coalition for secession. This was an expression of southern political identity but was also clearly aimed at attracting international support, particularly from regional allies roused against Ali Abdulla Saleh because of his stance in the Gulf War. Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf Council states, including Saudi Arabia, covertly backed the south. The United States distanced itself somewhat from the position of its Gulf War allies, though it opposed Ali Abdulla Saleh's war.

The south's enlistment of support abroad, however, was effectively neutralized by Sana's diplomacy. The northern leadership had learned from the Gulf War not to alienate the international community. Ali Abdulla Saleh and his officials responded to foreign efforts to stop the war by saying they welcomed assistance and agreed to cooperate with all international missions. On the ground, however, the northern military marched steadily toward its goal of complete military victory, which it achieved early in July with the fall of Aden.

Since then Ali Abdulla Saleh has been caught in a political juggling act, attempting to balance his efforts to rebuild his regime's legitimacy in the country—in particular, in the regions formerly ruled by the YSP—and the demands of Islah, his partner in government. Islah, originally created as a counterweight to the YSP and other socialist trends, has seen its power greatly enhanced by the elimination of the YSP. Islah demanded that the YSP not be allowed to return to the government, and the new government formed in

October reveals Islah's ascendancy. The YSP is excluded from the governing coalition (meaning it has no ministers in the cabinet); and Islah received 8 of 25 ministries, including the key portfolios of education, commerce, and local government. Ali Abdulla Saleh has no ideological commitment to Islah's political project, however, and to maintain his political supremacy he would like to foster the emergence of a force opposed to the neo-Islamic politics of Islah, a sort of controllable version of the YSP. To this end, the president issued a general amnesty for all but 16 of the top leaders of the secessionist government, who had fled to Cairo, Oman, Jidda, Abu Dhabi, and Damascus. Many took advantage of the amnesty and returned to Yemen, though the leadership remains politically active outside the country. Although Ali Abdulla Saleh has urged the YSP to install new officials that conform to the conditions imposed on them, his desire for tight control has prevented the party from rebuilding in earnest. Further, the group's ample financial assets have been confiscated by members of both Islah and the government and are not being returned.

Islah's new importance has led some to say that Yemen is slipping into the fundamentalist camp. While it is true that neo-Islamic currents are much stronger now than before the war, Yemen is ruled by Ali Abdulla Saleh, a secular military man who will not tolerate significant challenges to his authority. Having engineered the destruction of the YSP in the war, he will brook no challenges from the "right" either. In September fundamentalists mounted an effort to destroy Islamic religious sites in Aden that they felt were not proper; some 2,000 armed men equipped with heavy construction equipment descended on the city in a well-organized operation. The president responded by rushing military reinforcements to Aden, and the attackers were repelled after a daylong engagement in which 50 people were killed.

It remains to be seen whether Ali Abdulla Saleh can forge a political alliance that will gain legitimacy among Yemen's varied regions and ideological strands, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces where the YSP ruled. The government has a restricted social base, and Islah will attempt to keep out other voices that it opposes. The economy has continued on its downward spiral after the war, and the neighboring oil states show little sign of becoming less hostile toward Yemen's strongman. In choosing to destroy his former partners in the unity government by military means rather than negotiating a solution, Ali Abdulla Saleh has led Yemen into further instability, bolstering the claim of his ex-archrival, Ali Salim al-Beidh, that the regime will prevent Yemen from entering the twenty-first century. ■

“Everything that has happened since 1992 has been the result of a rigorous political logic. The Afghan civil war is not ‘primitive’ or ‘tribal,’ but strongly political. Ethnic identification and tensions play a part, but the country’s warring parties invoke and feed these to mobilize supporters.”

Afghanistan’s Civil War

BY GILLES DORRONSORO

After Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in February 1989, the mujahideen (Islamic guerrillas), who had waged a nearly decade-long war of liberation, turned their guns on the Soviet-installed regime of President Najibullah. But it was not until the fall of the communists in Moscow in August 1991 and the end of Soviet aid that they were able to deal a decisive blow to the regime in Kabul. The combined forces of mujahideen Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Doestam, an Uzbek militia leader who had defected from Najibullah’s camp, took the capital in April 1992.

Fighting immediately began among the victorious parties in a country that had been at war since 1979. This new war’s frequently shifting alliances give the impression of irrationality and chaos, but everything that has happened since 1992 has been the result of a rigorous political logic. The Afghan civil war is not “primitive” or “tribal,” but strongly political. Ethnic identification and tensions play a part, but the country’s warring parties invoke and feed these to mobilize supporters.

The interim government under President Burhanuddin Rabbani, sworn in 1992, has been under attack in Kabul by the government’s erstwhile partners: the forces of Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar since 1992 and, since January 1994, by General Doestam. The question facing the numerous groups involved in the conflict is the establishment of a new political balance and the development of a workable political system in Afghanistan. The many battles waged around the capital are explained by the parties’ need to control the symbolic and actual heart of this process.

GILLES DORRONSORO, an assistant professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris and a member of the editorial boards of *Cultures et Conflits* and *Lettre d’Asie Centrale*, is preparing a book on the Afghan civil war. Among his latest publications are “La politique de pacification en Afghanistan,” in Gérard Chaliand, editor, *Stratégies de la guérilla* (Paris: Payot, 1994), and “Les enjeux de l’aide en Afghanistan,” *Cultures et Conflits*, no. 11 (Fall 1993). This article was translated from the French by Percival Mangano.

FOUR PARTIES FOR A STRONG NEW STATE

Well aware of its strong position in the country, Massoud’s Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) is willing to become the backbone of a new governing coalition. The principal group in the north, it also boasts strong support in the west and the south in Kandahar province. It has a presence in or dominates Kabul, Herat, the provincial capital Kandahar, and most of the other leading cities except Jalalabad, near the Pakistani border, and Mazar-i-Sharif.

The Jamiat-i-Islami is an Islamic party composed mainly of Sunni Muslim Tajiks (the second-largest ethnic group in the country), and besides Massoud numbers among its members President Rabbani and mujahideen commander and Ismael Kahn. Its leadership favors the rapid construction of a centralized state. Either to forward their ideological project or out of simple administrative necessity, party leaders have begun fostering embryonic regional states in Herat and in the zone controlled by Massoud in the northeast.

The Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), led by Prime Minister Hekmatyar, is a Sunni group with a radical vision of an Islamic state. Its recruits come from the intelligentsia, and are mainly Pashtun, the largest and most influential ethnic group in the country. When the other parties were putting the struggle against the Soviets first, the Hezb-i-Islami chose to focus instead on eliminating its rivals, thus poisoning relations with most of them. Furthermore, the group hoped to take control of Kabul by itself and impose its idea of an Islamic state.

Hezb-i-Islami’s hand has weakened considerably over the past two years. It has been driven from positions it held in the west and north, thus paying for its war strategy and its opposition to the Jamiat-i-Islami. Today its forces have regrouped to the south of Kabul and on the road leading to Jalalabad (and to Pakistan). Finally, for a party whose cadres are mainly urban, the Hezb-i-Islami has suffered a significant defeat: it does not control one important city.

The Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) is also mainly made up of Pashtuns. Its

leadership is controlled by the Sunni *ulema*, or religious scholars. Mohammad Nabi, Harkat leader, wants to build a state based on sharia (Islamic law); he openly opposes talk of self-determination among Afghanistan's ethnic and religious minorities.

The last of the parties supporting a strong new state, the Ettehad (Alliance), led by Abdul Rasul Sayaf, is generously financed by the conservative Wahhabite networks in Saudi Arabia. Pashtuns west of Kabul and in Kunduz province in the northeast supply the bulk of recruits for this fundamentalist group. Wahhabite support obligates the Ettehad to oppose the Shia (and therefore, indirectly, Shiite Iran) and to impose an Islamic regime that is outwardly conservative on morals. Anti-Shiite feeling in Afghanistan has long been expressed and reinforced by racist behavior toward the Hazara ethnic group, a Shiite people who have traditionally opposed the Pashtun. And a conservative morality is natural to the social base of the party, clerical as well as Pashtun. Ettehad has been behind symbolic measures such as the withdrawal of female television show hosts.

THREE PARTIES AGAINST A STRONG STATE

Much of the tension that has arisen since the fall of Najibullah arises from the refusal of two parties, the Hezb-i-Wahdat and the Jumbesh, to accept a stabilized political situation. For their different reasons, both groups fear the creation of a strong centralized state.

The Hezb-i-Wahdat (Unity Movement) is essentially a regrouping of the Shiite Hazara, an ethnic group originally from central Afghanistan that has traditionally been despised, especially by Pashtuns. The movement espouses an ideology based on the beliefs of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. From the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan, the Hazara have been, in practice, autonomous from the state and the Sunni parties.

The Hezb views a rebuilt centralized state, which would surely fall into the hands of the Sunnis, as a threat to Hazara independence. Furthermore, no other party is currently willing to recognize cultural or judicial autonomy for the Hazara minority. So the Hezb-i-Wahdat feels blocked. It hesitates between involvement in government in exchange for certain guarantees (a federal system, for example) and going into opposition to prevent the formation of a state in order to maintain its own independence.

Rashid Doestam's Jumbesh (Front) was formed in 1922 by former communist cadres and militiamen from the north. The group controls large stretches of northern Afghanistan and employs a "Turkish" (Uzbek and Turkmen) nationalist rhetoric, although its supporters also include a sizable number of ethnic Tajiks. Because its members fought the mujahideen almost until the end, as well as because of its former secularism, the Jumbesh is not recognized as legitimate by the

groups that resisted the Soviet invasion. In the long run it cannot hope to remain a political force in a pacified Afghanistan.

With no possibility of playing a part in peaceful politics, the Jumbesh's only chance for survival lies in divisions between the mujahideen. It plays on these to weaken the strongest party at any given moment and so prevent the formation of a dominant coalition.

Maulvi Yunis Khalis, a former theology teacher, founded the relatively small but well-armed Hezb-i-Islami of Yunis Khalis, a breakaway faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. The majority of the group's militants are Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan, which is, in the absence of a strong central government, currently undergoing a "retribalization" (also taking place in other Pashtun areas, but on a lesser scale). With the fragmentation of tribes in the region, a multitude of political affinities based on clan ties have developed. Strictly political factors such as party membership and ideology have lost importance; the conflicts arising in these zones are thus seldom dependent on the situation in the country as a whole. The political authorities in these regions—the tribal leaders—have no great desire to influence the future of the state, preferring instead to stay at a distance to preserve their tribal autonomy, which has historically been threatened by a central government.

Because of its lack of cohesion, Khalis's Hezb-i-Islami does not have a strong national strategy. Its absence from the battlefields of Kabul is in this sense systematic. The group's most important commanders act independently, following regional interests. The group seems satisfied controlling its region, counting on the tribal system to protect the eastern Pashtuns from a centralized state.

THE TRANSFORMING ALLIANCES

There are presently two alliances in Afghanistan: one centered around the Jamiat-i-Islami, supporting Rabbani as president of the republic, and the other around Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, which regroups the enemies of the government. Two oppositions structure the political maneuvering between the two groups: first, the impossibility of Hezb-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Islami ever forming a real alliance, which has been demonstrated by their continued clashes since the end of the 1970s; and second, the antagonism between the Hezb-i-Wahdat and the Ettehad, rooted in ethno-religious differences (Shia-Hazara against Sunni-Pashtun). Over the past two years the Jamiat-i-Islami, which controls most of Kabul, has tried to create a coalition capable of restoring the state, while the Hezb-i-Islami directs its rockets against its foe, determined to wreck any attempt at political stabilization.

The alliances went through several transformations before arriving at this point. Najibullah's ouster in 1992 apparently marked a shift toward an ethnic logic.

At first, what was effectively a coalition of Jumbesh, Jamiat-i-Islami (chiefly speaking, Commander Massoud), and Hezb-i-Wahdat shared power in the capital. All three wanted to swiftly accept a UN plan for a peaceful transition of power and finish with Hekmatyar, who threatened to take the city. To Massoud, control of Kabul meant the possibility of placing the Jamiat-i-Islami at the heart of any future settlement. Najibullah's ouster permitted Doestam to take control in the northern provinces and enter the new political game while attempting to make people forget Jumbesh's past. The Hezb-i-Wahdat seized the opportunity to build up support in Kabul, where there is an important Hazara community. The Hezb-i-Wahdat's military presence in Kabul, Hazaras hope, would allow them to influence the country's future.

In fact, the Hezb-i-Wahdat and the Jumbesh believed that Massoud would become a convert to "ethnic realism" and restrain his influence in Afghanistan's northeastern quarter, which would legitimate the division of the country on a politico-ethnic basis. However, the Jamiat-i-Islami viewed its alliance with the other two parties as a tactic to gain control of the capital and oust the Hezb-i-Islami; it never renounced its goal of a united Islamic state. Thus a new, anti-Pashtun coalition based on ethnic solidarity burst onto the scene, causing another dramatic shift in alliances.

The second phase began in fall 1992, when Massoud launched an operation to disarm the Hezb-i-Wahdat in Kabul. The pretext was that the Hezb had engaged in organized extortion from the non-Hazara population; in reality, Massoud wanted to break with the Hazara party because the alliance with it had prevented the Jamiat-i-Islami from including Pashtun parties in the government coalition. The disarmament effort was not a military success, but with the Hezb-i-Wahdat out of the coalition the Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami took the step of becoming a member of the interim government. The Ettihad followed suit, abandoning its alliance with the Hezb-i-Islami.

The third, most recent phase started when the Jumbesh rallied the opposition against the government last January, some months after adopting a neutral stance in the clashes between the Hezb-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Islami around Kabul. The Jumbesh's decision to oppose the government was probably forced by the Hezb-i-Wahdat's rapprochement with the Jamiat-i-Islami in fall 1993. It seemed plausible that Hezb-i-Islami forces around Kabul might at last be marginalized, which would remove any justification for the Jumbesh's presence in the capital. The Jumbesh feared that the Jamiat-i-Islami's dominance, combined with stabilization of the political situation, would quickly marginalize it. Finally, in September, the Hezb-i-Wahdat abandoned its neutrality and joined the groups opposing the government coalition.

THE WAR'S REGIONALIZATION

After the Soviet Union withdrew, the Afghan crisis essentially became regional, making the policies of the neighboring powers—Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan—especially important. Each of these three countries is linked to one of the parties in Afghanistan: Pakistan with the Hezb-i-Islami, Iran with the Hezb-i-Wahdat, and Uzbekistan with the Jumbesh. Relations are a matter of reciprocal manipulation: each tries to command the other to further its own interests. The three neighboring powers all oppose the rebuilding of the Afghan state by the coalition led by the Jamiat-i-Islami, but they cannot agree on a common course. The divisions among the three states correspond to those between their client parties; one can see the flaw in the assumption that eliminating certain actors in the now-regionalized conflict in Afghanistan will automatically ensure stabilization.

In Pakistan, the policy toward Afghanistan that had been defined by General Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s and 1980s continues to hold sway, despite Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's attempts during her first government (1988–1990) to take Afghan policy out of the army's hands. Pakistan's basic objective is to weaken the Afghan state, which since 1947 has favored an alliance with India. Pakistan's military and political support for the Hezb-i-Islami is thus partially attributable to the Hezb's lack of nationalist rhetoric (the party even went so far as to advocate confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan). This consistent backing of one party has in practice contributed to destabilization in Afghanistan—which, incidentally, undermines Pakistan's pretensions to play an important role in postcommunist Central Asia, since Afghanistan is a crucial passageway to that region.

Pakistani influence in Afghanistan has greatly diminished since Kabul's fall to the mujahideen. The northern coalition was formed in reaction to Pakistani influence, and Pakistan's allies (principally Hezb-i-Islami) found themselves left out of the government coalition. And the return of Afghan parties that had operated out of Pakistan during the war has further sapped Pakistan's bargaining power at the parties' negotiating table. Since the mujahideen victory, anti-Pakistan sentiments have been expressed more openly by Afghan leaders, and a nationalist reaction to Pakistani intervention has developed—predictably, in the north, less so in Kandahar province in the south.

Iran also wants to play a major role in the regional balance of power. But it has adopted a defensive posture toward the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan, while taking a more overtly offensive line toward the Middle East.

With Afghanistan, Shiite, Persian-speaking Iran could have tried to develop ties on the basis of shared language (the Hazara and Tajiks speak Persian) or shared religion (since the Hazara are Shiites). However,

only solidarity with the Shia has been encouraged; the Sunni Islamist parties in Afghanistan have kept their distance. During much of the Soviet occupation, Teheran was preoccupied with its war with Iran, and so gave mainly verbal support to Afghanistan's mujahideen. As a result, Iran's relations with the parties that fought the Soviets remain cool to this day.

Since the Soviet withdrawal, Iran's policy toward Afghanistan has been to avoid the establishment in Kabul of a Saudi-backed Islamic regime, which would mean the isolation of Afghanistan's Shiites, who constitute the only card Iran now holds in the country. The formation of the Hezb-i-Wahdat in 1990 was largely an Iranian initiative, aimed at bringing together all Shiites in Afghanistan, or at least the Hazaras. But the Hezb-i-Wahdat's departure from the government alliance has indirectly weakened Iran's grip on the party; the group's Hazara nationalist logic, unconstrained by membership in the government, has often run contrary to Iranian diplomatic initiatives.

The Afghan crisis has fewer implications for Uzbekistan than it does for Pakistan or Iran. Uzbekistan's main worry is the Afghan refugees on Uzbek soil, but these number only a few thousand and in any case are under strict control. The Uzbek government's key external objective is to guarantee all international frontiers to prevent the destabilization of Central Asia. The border with Afghanistan is particularly important; President Islam Karimov's secular regime fears an Islamic contagion emanating from Afghanistan (or, indirectly, from Tajikistan, where an Islamic-based insurgency rages).

Uzbekistan has backed the Jumbesh in Afghanistan in the quest for a reliable ally to guard its southern border—not because of ethnic solidarity with Uzbeks in Afghanistan. In fact, the revival of Uzbek nationalism that the Jumbesh is sponsoring is not necessarily in Uzbekistan's interests, since Tashkent is eager to preserve the existing border with Afghanistan. However, the Afghan Islamist parties' backing of the Islamist insurgents in Tajikistan, and the absence of a working central government in Afghanistan force Uzbekistan to support the Jumbesh. Uzbekistan's backing has its limits, but this does not prevent Jumbesh jets

from landing at the Termez base in southern Uzbekistan.

So long as the Jumbesh controls an important piece of the border, it is assured of Uzbekistan's backing. The risk for the Jumbesh is that it will remain confined to a small part of Afghanistan; for Uzbekistan, the danger is being shut out of future political developments in Kabul.

IN THE HANDS OF THE GENERALS

The radical transformation of the two coalitions in Afghanistan is unlikely in the coming months. The Jamiat-i-Islami may hope for a relatively stable alliance with the Harkat-i-Inqilab and the Ettihad since the relationship is based on alliances between local commanders in different provinces and compatible ideological projects. The Jamiat-Harkat-Ettihad axis, representing an alliance between Pashtuns and Tajiks, is the key to the government coalition's stability. If the alliance breaks up, the Jamiat-i-Islami will lose much of its influence in the south. For the time being, the outlook is favorable since the government coalition controls more territory than its enemies.

The second alliance, built around the Hezb-i-Islami, is not based on a political project. Between the Jumbesh, the Hezb-i-Wahdat, and the Hezb-i-Islami, there are no common interests other than the tactical one of preventing the government coalition from restoring the state.

The logic of the alliances has been mainly political to now. Despite the impression the first, northern-based coalition might have given, no ethnic opposition is expressing itself in the logics of the current alliances. The opposition is instead organized thus: the more fragmented and tribal south against a north organizing itself on the model of regional ministates.

Finally, the UN, discredited after the failure of its 1992 transition plan, is encouraging a new agreement. But the military situation is still open, making a negotiated outcome improbable—especially since it is difficult to see on what terms the still powerful regional powers would sign an agreement. Military evolutions remain the determining force in a country that has lived in war for 15 years. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Summing Up: An Autobiography

By Yitzhak Shamir. New York: Little, Brown, 1994. 276 pp., \$24.95.

Beyond the Promised Land:

Jews and Arabs on a Hard Road to a New Israel

By Glenn Frankel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 416 pp., \$24.

The state of Israel has never lacked challenges to its existence. Granted to the Jews by UN mandate in 1948, Israel was from the beginning a state of irony: the incoming Jewish settlers displaced Palestinians as they themselves had been displaced in Europe—by violence and intimidation. The new Israeli leaders faced major problems, including unruly dissidents, a police force prone to violence, party infighting, the wealth, influence, and antagonism of the surrounding Arab states, and the need for enormous economic aid. Yitzhak Shamir has dedicated his life to the state of Israel: he witnessed its birth and has filled many roles in its establishment and growth. Zionism is the rock of his belief, a conviction strengthened by his service in the Jewish underground, in the first Israeli secret security detail, as Knesset member and speaker, and finally, as the country's foreign minister and prime minister.

In his autobiography, *Summing Up*, Shamir recounts the events that followed from his Zionist dream and defends his political decisions. He often digresses from his storyline, and sometimes teasingly omits details, but what his story lacks in organization and background is compensated for by his personality and his unabashed, not always diplomatically stated criticisms of fellow Israelis and international diplomats, including Ronald Reagan, Menachem Begin, and George Bush. Reagan keeps a picture of a girl maimed by Israeli bombs in Lebanon on his desk, but still seems to treat Israel with favor; Begin, a nemesis, attempts to cut Shamir out of the diplomatic action; and Bush, seemingly mild, proves instrumental in starting the Madrid Middle East peace talks.

Given Shamir's strong opinions, it is not surprising that Middle East peace was not achieved during his tenure as prime minister. Palestinians—deserted by their wealthy Arab allies, who could easily have paid for their relocation—must, Shamir believes, accept Israel as a state as a prerequisite to any settlement and must discuss only cooperation and reconciliation. The former prime minister's insistence on the sanctity of Israel's borders—nothing less than “Eretz Israel”—stymied Reagan and Bush administration attempts to induce dialogue, as did his adamant refusal to meet with “the

terrorist” Arafat or any Palestinians from outside the occupied territories. Shamir bemoans the return of Sinai and Taba to Egypt, and in his epilogue denounces the current Israeli desire for peace, which he calls a “golden calf, to be worshipped at the expense of the values and aspirations that made Israel unique.” “I can only hope that the people of Israel... seek a viable peace that has not been bought with their security, their land or their rights.”

Shamir's vision looks less romantic and even promises danger in Glenn Frankel's *Beyond the Promised Land*, a chronicle of the Palestinian uprising and rocky peace negotiations. Here, Shamir is more ruthless terrorist and inflexible obstacle than Zionist protector. Indeed, in Frankel's version of the complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no leader is perfect, no philosophy sound, no aggression warranted. Both sides have come up against their own ignorance, inexperience, and brutality in their search for idealistic goals, creating waves of discontent with each tactical blunder. In the middle of this flood, Frankel pulls out stories of people caught in the tide. Remarkably evenhanded, Frankel's book goes beyond pure politics to the “everyday” Jews and Palestinians, recording the very real physical, mental, and emotional impact of Israeli policy and Palestinian resistance.

Palestinian outrage, culminating in the seven-year intifada, has been only somewhat appeased by the recent peace settlement between Israel and the PLO, and Yasir Arafat now faces the same challenges that have dogged the Israeli government since 1948. Creating a unified state out of disparate peoples and a harsh land takes more than romantic appeals to nationalist sentiment, as these books clearly show; vision and stamina, untempered by tolerance and patience, lead to dead ends and devastating results.

Melissa J. Sherman

Quest for Change:

Civil Society and Middle East Politics

Produced and written by Augustus Richard Norton and Steven R. Talley. Los Angeles: Banda Productions, 1994.

28.5 minutes. Purchase price, \$190; rental fee, \$50.

Distributed by First Run/Icarus Films, New York, N.Y.

Westerners often think of a democracy as a system supported and reinforced by the government in question—which automatically disqualifies most of the Middle East from the “democratic” category. An international group of academics disagree with this narrow kind of analysis, and in the documentary video “Quest for Change” present an optimistic view of what

they see as the seeds of democratic government: Middle Eastern civil society.

The cutoff of aid following the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with economic crises at home, prevented governments from providing the stable economies and government services their citizens once accepted in exchange for political and personal freedom. A variety of nongovernmental organizations, the film goes on to argue, stepped in to fill the gaps in services and provide outlets for expression; the film concludes that these nonviolent religious, medical, social, political, and professional groups are the true seeds of democracy in the Middle East. This assessment of Middle Eastern politics, presented through well-edited video clips and interviews, is a positive and educational analysis of a region overburdened with negative press.

M. J. S.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy

By William Korey. New York: St. Martin's, 1994. 529 pp., \$45, cloth; \$19.95, paper.

William Korey, a former director of international policy research at B'nai B'rith, spent two decades studying United States policy toward human rights at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), otherwise known as the "Helsinki process" after the locale of its marathon founding meeting in 1973. He came to know well most United States officials involved with Helsinki, as well as many others from participating countries. Drawing on that access and knowledge, Korey, writing here with the authoritative ease of a scholar at his peak, has produced the most detailed work yet on what was once called "Basket III" of the CSCE and is today designated "the human dimension" of security.

Korey is a master storyteller well matched to an intricate and important story—so important, he argues, that one cannot really understand the decay and demise of Soviet power and the collapse of European communism without it. From Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's broad indifference to even modest European initiatives on human rights at the CSCE, Korey goes on to treat the shift in American perceptions and engagement that began with Ford, developed into activism (and then ideological assertiveness) under Carter and Reagan, and culminated in a role as leader of those CSCE states interested in moving past rhetoric ("the promises we make") to real implementation ("the promises we keep") of human commitments. Yet while presidents provide the mileposts, the figures of note in this study are the ambassadors assigned to the Helsinki process, especially Arthur Goldberg and Max Kampelman. Congress is given a major part as well,

acted out by that creature unique in American foreign policy and among CSCE countries, the Helsinki Commission (which presently faces extinction from what Korey aptly depicts as ill-conceived complacency about the triumph of human rights in Europe in the absence of a Soviet threat).

Throughout, the focus is almost exclusively on human rights, which for Korey—though not necessarily for the countries involved—is the axis on which the entire Helsinki process turns. Security issues (Basket I) of the process are discussed only insofar as Korey views them as linked to human rights, and economic concerns (Basket II) are deliberately ignored. The founding conference and major follow-up meetings of the CSCE are assessed in turn. Korey's discussion of all these events, and the evolution of United States policy on human rights across five administrations, is balanced, judicious, and nonpartisan. Indeed, this is perhaps the best work ever by a single author dealing with human rights in America's foreign policy.

But by dealing solely with the human dimension of the Helsinki process, *The Promises We Keep* comes close to unnecessarily pigeonholing, and thereby unintentionally depreciating, foreign policy concern for human rights. Korey is critical of those "realists" who see security and human rights as discrete foreign policy interests, and even as goals inescapably in conflict. He argues, persuasively, that regional concern for human and minority rights is "essential for meaningful security" and that the balance between the military and human dimensions of security "remains at the core of [the] CSCE." Yet whenever the narrative touches on security it quickly falls into the same language of "trade-offs" and "linkage" that skeptics use to build fears that more central and immediate national interests will be sacrificed to a self-indulgent humanitarianism.

The idea that national (and international) security may be reinforced rather than undermined by broad promotion of democracy and human rights is no longer even controversial: the CSCE and the UN both proclaim the principle in their central documents and undertakings. This is an advance that had a great deal to do with the force and influence of United States policy—with what Arthur S. Link called the "higher realism" of the Wilsonian tradition. Korey has made an important contribution to our understanding of the role of the United States in pushing these ideas in the CSCE, and he clearly recognizes the connection. But the definitive study of the Helsinki process will remain unwritten so long as an artificial barrier is raised between the human and military (and economic) dimension of security.

Cathal J. Nolan

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

November 1994

INTERNATIONAL

Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Nov. 15—APEC ends its annual meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia; during the meeting Chile was formally admitted as the group's 18th member; the APEC leaders attending also announced their aim to achieve free and open trade in the region by 2020.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Nov. 28—The agency says IAEA inspectors allowed to visit North Korea last week confirmed that, in accordance with a pact the US and North Korea signed in October, work had been halted at nuclear sites there.

United Nations (UN)

Nov. 4—The Security Council votes unanimously to withdraw by March 21 the remaining 17,000 UN troops in Somalia; the military-humanitarian operation to alleviate the civil war there has cost the UN about \$1 billion.

Nov. 8—The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal asks Germany to deliver into UN custody Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb accused of the torture, murder, and forced deportation of Muslims in Bosnia's Prijedor region in 1992. Tadic, who was arrested by German authorities earlier this year, will be tried by the tribunal next year and faces life imprisonment if convicted.

ALGERIA

Nov. 1—A bomb is detonated in Mostaganem during a patriotic rally, killing 6 people and wounding 30. Islamic militants have been waging a violent campaign against the government since it annulled elections in 1992.

Nov. 2—Colonel Djelloul Hadj Cherif, the military commander in Algiers, is killed in the capital by suspected Muslim militants while negotiating the surrender of 9 fundamentalist guerrillas.

Nov. 12—Three Algerians who say they are members of the Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria hijack an Algerian commercial jetliner and force the pilot to fly to Majorca, where they surrender to Spanish authorities.

Nov. 15—At least 8 prisoners are killed and 60 wounded when Muslim militants on death row attempt to escape from a prison near Algiers.

ANGOLA

Nov. 7—The government reports its troops have recaptured the northwestern oil center of Soyo from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). On October 31 the government and UNITA initialed a peace agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, to end the civil war that began in 1975. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi restarted the war after a 16-month peace when UNITA lost a 1st round of elections in 1992.

Nov. 12—The government announces that its troops have captured Huambo, UNITA's last stronghold and Angola's 2d-largest city.

Nov. 15—In Lusaka, the 2 sides in the civil war sign a truce that will take effect in 24 hours. The UN special representa-

tive to Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, says the Angolan National Assembly last week approved a blanket war crimes amnesty for both the government and the rebels.

Nov. 20—In Lusaka, the government and UNITA sign the peace treaty. The treaty text is not made public, but drafters say UNITA will be a junior partner in the government, naming cabinet ministers, governors, and mayors; the treaty also provides for a runoff presidential election because President José Eduardo dos Santos won less than 50% of the vote in the 1st round of elections in 1992. Savimbi does not attend the ceremony; his deputies say he did not trust the government to guarantee his safety.

BELARUS

Nov. 12—President Aleksandr Lukashenko announces that he will set prices by decree, assume personal control of the state security agency, and arrest officials who fail to enforce his orders. Prices rose at least 50% over 10 days this week when Lukashenko traveled to Russia for medical treatment.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Nov. 3—The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. The Security Council must adopt a similar resolution before the embargo can be lifted.

Nov. 4—Bosnian Serb forces fire 2 surface-to-air missiles at Bihac, a UN-declared safe area; 7 people are wounded in the attack.

Nov. 5—Bosnian Muslims are reported to have captured Kulen Vakuf, near Bihac.

Nov. 8—In violation of the UN prohibition against the use of heavy artillery within a 12.5-mile zone centered on Sarajevo, shells are fired into the city, killing 4 people and wounding 6; Bosnian Serbs are believed responsible; no UN retaliation is planned.

Nov. 13—Bosnian Serb soldiers and Bosnian government forces continue fighting in the Bihac enclave, where the Serbs are attempting to regain territory lost in a Bosnian government offensive last month.

Nov. 19—Bosnian Serb fighter jets, believed to have flown from Croatia, bomb the northwestern region near Bihac, violating the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Nov. 21—NATO jets, acting under UN authority, bomb a Serb-controlled air base at Ubdina, Croatia, which has been used to launch jets that have bombed Bihac; 2 people are killed and 4 wounded.

Nov. 23—NATO jets attack Bosnian Serb-held missile sites in the Bihac enclave; the UN reports that Bosnian Serb troops have entered the UN-declared safe area around Bihac.

Nov. 24—The *New York Times* reports that the Bosnian Serbs are demanding the surrender of Bosnian government forces in Bihac after capturing half the UN-declared safe area.

Nov. 26—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic throws UN commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose out of a meeting, accusing him and UN diplomat Yasushi Akashi of blocking NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs attacking the Bihac enclave; the 2 are blocking NATO raids, he said, in order to force the Bosnian government to accept a peace plan.

Nov. 27—Bosnia accepts a UN plan for a local cease-fire around the town of Bihac; *The New York Times* reports that the Bosnian Serbs will not consent to a cease-fire unless the Bosnian government agrees that the war is over and that each side will retain only land currently held.

Bosnian Serb soldiers kidnap 165 UN peacekeepers from military convoys traveling in Serb-held areas.

Nov. 28—Bosnian Serb militias shell Bihac and set up a surface-to-air missile system within range of the Sarajevo airport.

Nov. 29—The UN announces it will withdraw its peacekeeping troops from Bosnia unless all sides agree to a universal cease-fire.

Nov. 30—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic refuses to meet with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Sarajevo because the meeting place is not in Serb-occupied territory. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, who attends the meeting, says the government will accept a 3-month truce only.

Bosnian Serbs release 43 UN peacekeepers seized November 26 near Goradze. The UN reports that Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic has offered to return all UN hostages in exchange for NATO's flight plans for surveillance missions over the Bosnian no-flight zone.

BURUNDI

Nov. 20—In the northeastern province of Kirundo, 16 people are hacked to death with machetes and 4 are burned alive; preliminary reports say the attackers were Tutsi and the victims Hutu. At least 144 people have died in similar incidents since the beginning of October. The army reports its units are being attacked almost daily by Hutu rebels loyal to former Interior Minister Leonard Nyangoma, now in exile in Zaire.

CAMBODIA

Nov. 15—The rebel Khmer Rouge acknowledges it executed 3 foreign tourists it kidnapped in a raid on a passenger train in southern Cambodia July 26; it says the 3 were spies for Vietnam.

CHINA

Nov. 12—In secret proceedings, a Beijing court has convicted journalist Gao Yu and sentenced her to 6 years in prison for disclosing state secrets, her family reports; the charges are believed to be related to articles Gao wrote for the Hong Kong magazine *Monthly Mirror*.

Nov. 14—The identification of a fetus's sex by technical means for purposes of sex selection will be prohibited under a law to take effect in January, health officials announce.

FRANCE

Nov. 6—Authorities in Metz deport to Algeria fundamentalist Muslim cleric Nafa Zahar Eddine, saying he poses a threat to public order; this is the 3d such deportation in 2 weeks.

Nov. 8—In raids in Paris and its suburbs, police arrest 95 people said to have links to Algeria's Armed Islamic Group. Interior Minister Charles Pasqua says the evidence gathered confirms the "implantation" of a network of Muslim militants who plan to direct terrorist actions from Europe.

Nov. 12—The government announces the resignation of Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin, who oversees foreign development assistance, after allegations in the press that he received cash from a housing official; since July, 3 cabinet ministers have resigned after allegations of wrongdoing.

GERMANY

Nov. 15—Parliament elects Helmut Kohl to a 4th term as chancellor, 338-333—1 vote over the required margin.

Nov. 17—Rainer Rupp, a western German employee who passed thousands of NATO documents to the East German security service between 1977 and 1989, is sentenced in Berlin to 12 years in prison.

Nov. 22—Brandenburg state in eastern Germany announces it will pay parents \$650 for each new child they have; the birth rate in the state has dropped by more than two-thirds since 1989.

GUATEMALA

Nov. 11—In Guatemala City, American lawyer Jennifer Harbury ends the hunger strike she began 1 month ago; Harbury had hoped to force the government to reveal the whereabouts of her husband, guerrilla leader Efraín Bmaca Velásquez, who disappeared in March 1992 and was reported to have been seen alive in a military prison.

HAITI

Nov. 5—Parliament votes to approve President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's nominee for prime minister, Haitian businessman Smarck Michel.

Nov. 8—The cabinet is sworn in, including among its 17 members a number of ministers who held office under the military during its 3-year rule.

Nov. 11—More than 2,000 students, upset at having failed their graduation exams in September, ransack the Education Ministry in Port-au-Prince.

Nov. 16—Aristide resigns from the priesthood; he was dismissed from the Salesian order in 1988 for preaching political radicalism.

Nov. 17—Aristide dismisses acting commander in chief of the armed forces Jean-Claude Duperval, appointed a month ago by departing army chief Raoul Cédras; Brigadier General Bernardin Poisson, former commander of the Haitian fire department, will replace him.

Nov. 29—Prime Minister Michel announces that the government is postponing elections that had been scheduled for mid-December until next March; he says the extension gives the new government time to name a 9-member National Electoral Commission and organize the electoral process.

INDIA

Nov. 1—In a northern village, police free 3 British tourists kidnapped nearly 2 weeks ago by a militant Muslim group that had threatened to behead them unless the government released 10 jailed Kashmiri militants. An American tourist was freed yesterday in a raid in a village 90 miles north of New Delhi; 2 police officers and 1 militant were killed during the raid.

INDONESIA

Nov. 16—In Jakarta, Indonesia and the US announce agreements on 17 business projects, including a \$35-billion deal between Pertamina, the state oil company, and the Exxon Corporation to develop the Natuna Island natural gas field.

Nov. 22—Roman Catholic Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo says 135 people were arrested after 3 days of protests and rioting last week in East Timor province as President Suharto hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bogor. Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 and annexed it the following year; about 5,300 Indonesian army troops are stationed in the province.

IRAN

Nov. 27—Dissident writer Ali Akbar Saidi Sirjani dies in prison; Sirjani, who reportedly died of a heart attack, was arrested 8 months ago on drug and espionage charges but was not allowed a trial or a lawyer. His books have been banned in Iran since 1991.

IRAQ

Nov. 9—Iranian jets fire rockets at an Iranian Kurdish base in northern Iraq, killing at least 1 person and wounding 3 other people; it is the 2d attack on Iraq-based Iranian dissidents in a week.

Nov. 10—The government announces it will recognize Kuwait as an independent country and respect its borders. According to the terms of UN resolutions adopted during the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis, economic sanctions will be lifted once Iraq recognizes Kuwait's sovereignty, stops supporting terrorism, halts its campaigns against Shiite and Kurdish minorities, and fully discloses the extent of its mechanical and chemical weapons stocks.

IRELAND

Nov. 17—Prime Minister Albert Reynolds resigns after a break with the Labor Party, the Fianna Fail party's partner in the governing coalition; Labor criticized Reynolds for his handling of an extradition case against a Roman Catholic priest later convicted in Northern Ireland of child molestation. But Reynolds does not ask President Mary Robinson to dissolve parliament and call new elections.

Nov. 19—Fianna Fail members select Finance Minister Bertie Ahern as the party's new head.

ISRAEL

Nov. 3—Palestinians mourning Hani Abed, a leader of Islamic Holy War killed by a car bomb yesterday, bar PLO chairman Yasir Arafat from attending the funeral in a Jerusalem mosque.

Nov. 7—Israel reopens the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron to Muslim and Jewish worshippers; the site had been closed since February 25, when a Jewish settler opened fire on praying Muslims, killing 30.

Nov. 15—Israel formally hands over control of social services and tourism in the West Bank to the Palestinian National Authority as part of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leaders to gradually extend Palestinian control over the West Bank.

Nov. 24—An Israeli military court sentences Said Badarnah, a Palestinian, to death for planning an April 13 suicide bombing that killed the bomber and 5 Israelis; it is the first death sentence to be handed down by the court in 12 years.

Nov. 27—Israel formally establishes full diplomatic ties with Jordan, 1 month after the 2 countries signed a peace treaty.

In Beit Hagai in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Muslim militants kill Rabbi Ami Olami, the spiritual leader of the Otniel settlement, and an Israeli police officer; the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas claims responsibility.

Nov. 30—An ax-wielding Hamas militant kills an Israeli soldier at a bus stop in Afula; Israeli authorities say the killer entered Israel from the West Bank.

ITALY

Nov. 12—In Rome, more than 1 million people take part in demonstrations against proposed cuts in pensions and other social spending in the budget the government will submit to parliament November 14.

Nov. 22—Magistrates inform Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that he is under investigation in connection with bribes paid to tax auditors by 2 companies he owns. Berlusconi acknowledges the payments but says he had no personal knowledge of them.

Nov. 23—Berlusconi announces he will sell part of his Fininvest media and business conglomerate, including a majority interest in his 3 national television stations.

JAPAN

Nov. 26—Conservative and centrist opposition parties, including the Japan Renewal Party led by former Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata and Japan New Party under former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, say they will dissolve early next month to form the New Frontier Party, in hopes of toppling the governing Socialist–Liberal Democratic coalition in the next election.

KOREA, SOUTH

Nov. 7—President Kim Young Sam announces that the government will “start pushing for a policy of economic cooperation with North Korea”; direct trade with the north is currently against the law.

MEXICO

Nov. 23—Mario Ruiz Massieu resigns as deputy attorney general, accusing members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of masterminding the September 28 assassination of his brother, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the party's secretary general.

MOZAMBIQUE

Nov. 19—The National Electoral Commission announces that President Joaquim Chissano was reelected to his post in Mozambique's 1st free elections, held October 27–29, with 53.3% of the vote; Chissano's party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which has ruled since independence in 1975, won 129 of 250 seats in parliament. Afonso Dhlakama, head of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), was runner-up for president, with 33.7% of the vote; RENAMO, transformed into a political party from a guerrilla force in the 16-year civil war that ended in October 1992, won 112 seats. UN special representative Aldo Ajello says foreign observers were satisfied with the conduct of the election.

NAMIBIA

Nov. 24—De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines Limited gives up the monopoly on diamond mining in the country it has held since 1919, splitting its holdings 50–50 with the government; diamond mining is Namibia's main industry and employs the most private sector workers.

NEPAL

Nov. 23—Final results from the November 15 election show that the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist–Leninist) won 88 seats in the 205-seat parliament, defeating the governing centrist Nepali Congress Party, which took 83 seats; the Congress Party, however, led in the popular vote, 33% to 30%. The New Democrats, a rightist party with close links to the monarchy, win 20 seats. Communist leader Man Mohan Adhikary alleges the Congress Party committed “flagrant” electoral abuses. Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala called the election after losing a no-confidence vote in July because of party infighting; charges of corruption have also been leveled against the Congress. Nepal, formerly a monar-

chy, became a democracy in 1990.

Nov. 30—Man Mohan Adhikary is sworn in as prime minister, heading a minority government. The Communists have pledged to uphold multiparty democracy, the monarchy, and private enterprise while halting the sale of state firms and promising land reform.

NIGERIA

Nov. 21—Nobel Prize-winning novelist Wole Soyinka announces at a press conference in Paris that he has left Nigeria after a tip that he was about to be arrested.

NORWAY

Nov. 29—In a referendum, 52.2% of voters reject the European Union's offer of membership for Norway; rural areas came out against the measure, while Oslo and Bergen voted in favor of it. Norway is the only country to turn down membership in the EU; Austria, Sweden, and Finland all voted to join in referendums this year. In 1972 Norway rejected membership in the European Economic Community.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

Nov. 11—A Palestinian suicide bomber kills 3 soldiers and wounds 12 at an Israeli army checkpoint in Netzarim in the Gaza Strip; Islamic Holy War claims responsibility for the attack.

Nov. 12—Palestinian police arrest 100 suspected Islamic militants in response to yesterday's attack.

Nov. 14—Palestinian authorities ban street demonstrations in Gaza in a crackdown on Muslim militants.

Nov. 18—Palestinian police fire on stone-throwing protesters outside a mosque in Gaza, killing at least 12 people and wounding at least 200.

Nov. 20—Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat and the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas announce a temporary truce and an investigation of the November 18 killings.

Nov. 23—In Jericho, more than 5,000 Palestinians, many from Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO, demonstrate in support of Arafat.

Nov. 26—In a show of popular support, 20,000 Palestinians gather for a peaceful pro-Hamas demonstration in Gaza City, denounce the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and threaten continued violence against both.

Nov. 30—After 2 days of negotiations, 22 countries and 3 agencies offer a \$200-million aid package for job creation and rebuilding infrastructure in the Gaza Strip.

For the 3d day, the Palestinian Authority prevents the distribution of 2 Palestinian newspapers, *Al Quds* and *An Nahar*, because of their reporting on Hamas.

RUSSIA

Nov. 1—President Boris Yeltsin dismisses General Matvei Burakov, a deputy defense minister, because of allegations he participated in widespread corruption in the Western Army Group, the former Soviet force based in East Germany. Dmitri Kholodov, a reporter at the Moscow daily *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, was killed last month by a suitcase bomb while investigating the charges.

Nov. 4—Yeltsin names Vladimir Panskov finance minister; Panskov, who held a position in the Soviet Finance Ministry, was arrested in March 1993 and jailed on bribery charges that were dropped this year.

Nov. 8—Yeltsin appoints reformist Yevgeny Yasin economics minister. Aleksandr Shokhin resigned the post November 4 after Panskov was appointed finance minister without his approval.

Nov. 20—*The New York Times* reports on Russia's disclosure in May to a group of US scientists and officials at a small conference at the US Energy Department's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California that the Soviet Union and now Russia have disposed of billions of gallons of nuclear waste in injection wells. Wastes with radioactivity of up to 3 billion curies—about half the total amount produced by the Soviets and Russians—have been pumped into deep injection wells at Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, and Dimitrograd, Russia, all on or near major rivers.

At a congress of religious and clan leaders in Grozny, the capital of the breakaway republic of Chechnya, President Dzhokhar Dudayev says Chechnya may implement sharia (Islamic law) as a means of fighting Russian "aggression"; Dudayev says that 2 days ago Russian forces occupied the strategic village of Bratskoye and handed it over to pro-Russian opposition fighters. Dudayev declared Chechnya independent in 1991.

Nov. 30—For a 2d day, opposition jets bomb Grozny; 4 jet trainers at a military airport near the city are damaged; no casualties are reported. Yeltsin announced yesterday he would declare a state of emergency in Chechnya, which he says is part of Russia, if fighting did not stop by December 1. Dudayev says Russia is responsible for the bombing, and states that this "is tantamount to a declaration of war." Chechen military leaders have captured 70 people they claim are Russian soldiers and say they will begin executing them if Russia does not admit its role in the war in Chechnya; Russia says the men are mercenaries.

RWANDA

Nov. 1—More than 6,500 people are being detained on suspicion of involvement in the killing of ethnic Tutsis during the April-July civil war, *The New York Times* reports.

Nov. 14—The aid group Doctors without Borders stops providing services in the Rwandan refugee camp in Bukavu, Zaire, saying that former militia and army members and Hutu government officials control the camp by means of terror.

Nov. 28—Zairian troops have taken command of the Rwandan refugee camp in Katala, Zaire, aid workers report; 19 people were killed in clashes at the camp last week. An estimated 800,000 refugees are living in camps in Zaire after fleeing the civil war in Rwanda.

SOUTH AFRICA

Nov. 6—Johan Heyns, former head of the Dutch Reformed Church, who had condemned apartheid, is shot and killed at his home in Pretoria; no group takes responsibility.

SRI LANKA

Nov. 10—Results from yesterday's presidential election show that Prime Minister Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga received 65% of the vote, to 35% for Sirima Dissanayake. Dissanayake became the United National Party candidate after her husband, Gamini, was assassinated October 24. Kumaratunga was elected prime minister in August after her People's Alliance coalition gained a 1-seat majority in parliamentary elections, ending 17 years of United National Party governments. She will relinquish the prime ministership when she becomes president.

Nov. 13—After Kumaratunga's inauguration as president today, the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam announces a cease-fire.

Nov. 14—President Kumaratunga swears in her mother, Sirima, as prime minister; Sirima twice served in the post in the 1960s and 1970s. President Kumaratunga has promised

to abolish the strong executive presidency by July, when it is thought that she and her mother will switch jobs. The president also holds the finance and defense portfolios in the cabinet announced today.

SUDAN

Nov. 10—Some 80,000 people have fled the area near Nimule in southern Sudan in the past week because of intensified fighting in the 12-year-old civil war, a UN refugee official reports.

SWEDEN

Nov. 13—In a referendum, 52% of Swedes vote to join the EU in January; rural areas voted overwhelmingly against joining.

TURKEY

Nov. 17—The Turkish military has reported that government soldiers killed more than 3,000 fighters from the separatist Kurdish Workers Party this year, *The New York Times* reports. At least 13,000 people have died in related violence in the past decade.

UKRAINE

Nov. 16—Parliament votes for Ukraine to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty controlling nuclear arms, on condition that Russia, the US, and Britain pledge to respect Ukraine's borders and never to use nuclear weapons against it; since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been the world's 3d-largest nuclear power.

UNITED KINGDOM

HONG KONG

Nov. 4—After years of talks, China and Britain sign an agreement on financing Hong Kong's new \$20-billion airport that sets a cap on borrowing and calls for a portion of the cost to come from Hong Kong's budget. Work on the project has continued and contractors have been paid from the Hong

Kong treasury, under protest from China. Major details remain to be resolved before bank loans can be sought.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Nov. 10—A postal worker in Newry is shot and killed by 2 men, at least 1 of whom, Ulster police say, is a member of the Irish Republican Army. The IRA says the cease-fire that began September 1 is still in effect.

UNITED STATES

Nov. 6—The Clinton administration announces that it will withdraw 6,000 troops from Haiti by December 1 and all 7,800 ground troops from Kuwait by January.

Nov. 9—Results from yesterday's elections show that the Republican Party has gained a majority in both houses of the US Congress for the 1st time in nearly 50 years, and has captured a majority of state governorships.

Nov. 10—The Clinton administration orders US naval forces to stop enforcing the arms embargo against the Bosnian government as of November 12; Congress voted earlier this year to halt funding for US enforcement of the embargo November 15 unless the Bosnian Serbs signed a peace pact. Other NATO members will continue to enforce the ban.

Nov. 15—The Federal Reserve, worried the economy's recent growth could fuel inflation, votes unanimously to raise short-term interest rates 3/4 point, to 8%, the largest single increase since 1981.

Nov. 22—Officials report that the US has transported to its atomic laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, half a ton of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium that had been stored at the Soviet-era nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Kazakhstan.

URUGUAY

Nov. 29—Final results from the November 27 presidential elections show that centrist Colorado Party candidate and former President Julio Sanguinetti won with 31.2% of the vote, followed by the National Party candidate, with 30%, and the leftist Broad Front candidate with 29.8%. ■

Echoes and Visions: The Current History Reprint Series

Current History is now making available reprints of significant articles from its past—and at an affordable price. Choose from the following selections:

AFRICA

- ____ 1. Michael Clough, "The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement." May 1992. (6 pp.)
- ____ 2. Dennis C. Weeks, "The AIDS Pandemic in Africa." May 1992. (6 pp.)
- ____ 3. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "Doing Harm by Doing Good?: The International Relief Effort in Somalia." May 1994. (5 pp.)

CHINA

- ____ 4. O. Edmund Clubb, "China and the United States: Beyond Ping-Pong." September 1971. (7 pp.)

LATIN AMERICA

- ____ 5. Gillian Gunn, "Cuba's Search for Alternatives" and "Excerpts from an interview with Fidel Castro." February 1993. (6 pp.)
- ____ 6. Peter R. Andreas and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Cocaine Politics in the Andes." February 1992. (6 pp.)

THE MIDDLE EAST

- ____ 7. James A. Bill, "The Politics of Extremism in Iran." January 1982. (6 pp.)
- ____ 8. Robin Wright, "Islam's New Political Face." January 1991. (6 pp.)

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- ____ 9. Peter Arnett, "The ARVN: Prospects for the Army of South Vietnam." December 1969. (6 pp.)
- ____ 10. Hans J. Morgenthau, "U.S. Misadventure in Vietnam." January 1968. (6 pp.)

SOVIET UNION

- ____ 11. Alfred G. Meyer, "Russia after Stalin." January 1956. (7 pp.)
- ____ 12. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Soviet Policy and World Conquest." November 1959. (5 pp.)
- ____ 13. Marshall I. Goldman, "Perestroika in the Soviet Union." October 1988. (6 pp.)
- ____ 14. Elena Bonner, "Looking to the Future." October 1992. (5 pp.)

UNITED STATES

- ____ 15. W.E.B. Du Bois, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation." June 1935. (6 pp.)
- ____ 16. Sidney B. Fay, "The Marshall Plan." September 1947. (6 pp.)
- ____ 17. John P. and Constance L. Roche, "The McCarthy Issue." October 1954. (8 pp.)
- ____ 18. Henry S. Commager, "The Right of Dissent." October 1955. (7 pp.)
- ____ 19. James R. Schlesinger, "The Budget and National Security." July 1960. (6 pp.)
- ____ 20. Edward M. Kennedy, "The Need for Gun Control Legislation." July/August 1976. (4 pp.)

WESTERN EUROPE

- ____ 21. Winston Churchill, "What Can England Do About Hitler?" October 1938. (3 pp.)

Cost

Single-copy price: \$2.50
2 to 10 copies: \$2.25 each
11 to 20 copies: \$2.00 each
21 to 50 copies: \$1.75 each
51 to 100 copies: \$1.50 each
101 or more copies: \$1.00 each

Name _____

Address _____

City _____


State _____ Zip _____

☐ Please send me the reprints I have indicated above, in the quantities I have marked.

☐ Check enclosed ☐ Bill me

For American Express, Visa or Mastercard orders, call toll free, 1-800-726-4464 (9 AM–5 PM EST)

CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127 • 215-482-4464



SPECIAL CURRENT HISTORY OFFER

Take advantage of *Current History's* consistent excellence in covering the world by ordering a complete set of issues on the following countries and regions. Only \$19.95 per set!

The Soviet Union

- ☐ (1980-84)
☐ (1985-91)

Africa

- ☐ (1985-91)

India and South Asia

- ☐ (1982, '86, '89, '92)

Southeast Asia

- ☐ (1980, '83, '84, '87, '90)

The Middle East

- ☐ (1980, '81, '84, '87)
☐ (1988-92)

South America

- ☐ (1986-89, '91)

Latin America

- ☐ (1980-82, '84, '90)

Europe

- ☐ West (1981, '82, '84, '86, '88, '90)
☐ East (1981, '82, '85, '87, '89, '90)

China

- ☐ (1980-84)
☐ (1985-91)

Canada

- ☐ (1980, '84, '88, '91)

Japan

- ☐ (1983, '85, '88, '91)

Mexico

- ☐ (1981, '83, '87)

DISCOUNTS FOR BULK PURCHASE

Current History offers special discounts for orders of 10 or more copies of the same issue, and for 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address.

Available 1994-1995

- ☐ China (9/94)
☐ Russia and Eurasia (10/94)
☐ Europe (11/94)
☐ The Pacific Century? (12/94)
☐ The Middle East (1/95)
☐ Latin America (2/95)
☐ North America (3/95)
☐ Africa (4/95)
☐ Global Security (5/95)

Still Available

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> China (9/93) | <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1992 (9/92) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Russia and Eurasia (10/93) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Second Russian Revolution? (10/92) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Europe and the Balkans (11/93) | <input type="checkbox"/> Europe (11/92) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> East Asia (12/93) | <input type="checkbox"/> East Asia (12/92) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 80th Anniversary Edition (1/94) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1993 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East (2/94) | <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America (3/93) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America (3/94) | <input type="checkbox"/> New World Entropy (|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central Asia (4/94) | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa (5/93) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa (5/94) | |

"The Disintegration of the Soviet Union" *Current History* Audiocassette Series: Vol. 1.

Chart the course of the Soviet Union's demise with *Current History's* esteemed coverage!

NEW "China Rising: A Superpower Awakes" *Current History* Audiocassette Series: Vol. 2.

Current History's China experts guide you through China's dramatic economic and cultural evolution in our newest 90-minute tape.

Quantity Discount Price: 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$3.25 per copy—a savings of more than 30% (single-copy price, \$4.95). Copies more than five years old: \$6.00 per copy.

Quantity Subscription Price: 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address: \$24.75 per subscription.

- ☐ One-year subscription: US\$32.00
 (9 issues)

- ☐ Two-year subscription: US\$61.00
 (18 issues)

- ☐ Three-year subscription: US\$91.00
 (27 issues)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above, in the quantities I have marked.

- ☐ *Current History* Binders: US\$9.95

- ☐ "The Disintegration of the Soviet Union" Audiocassette: US\$11.95

- ☐ "China Rising: A Superpower Awakes" Audiocassette: US\$11.95

- ☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me.

For American Express, Visa or Mastercard orders, call toll free, 1-800-726-4464 (9 AM-5 PM EST)

Add US\$6.75 per year for foreign orders: US\$7.75 for Canada (price includes GST).

All offers are good only on new orders mailed directly to the publisher. Bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

***Current History* Binder:** A sturdy, hardcover binder will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. The easy-to-use binder holds a year of *Current History* securely in place over flexible steel rods.

CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, PA 19127 • 215-482-4464

1 C 114 R 1295
 AMBASSADOR COLLEGE
 PO BOX 111
 NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 TR